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During the Rwandan genocide, Hutu targeted Tutsi and allies. Interpreting this complex 
event requires examining the late 1950s.  Analyzing Tutsi and Hutu in central Rwanda in 1957 
improves understanding of political and social context preceding the genocide.  This study 
rejects that the genocide occurred as an inevitable event. Instead, it layers domestic actors with 
international groups: the White Fathers missionaries; the United Nations; Belgium; and the 
United States. Analyzing each group and synthesizing their interactions elevates Rwanda’s 
history from the falsehood of ancient adversaries to a complex, modern narrative. Studying 
Rwandan rhetoric and responses to it provides an opportunity to display and study Rwandan 
agency and identity.  This research analyzes sources from Tutsi and the Hutu perspectives, the 
White Fathers, the UN Visiting Mission, and Belgian reports. It provides a complex 




therefore presenting a nuanced view of identity and group dynamics in this transformative time 
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Corvée: French – a term found in French and Belgian imperial documents used to refer to 
forced labor, especially labor for a colonial superior by colonized peoples in a specific territory. 
Also used to refer to forced labor in Rwanda, including prior to colonialism. 
 
Évolués: French – a pejorative colonial term used within Belgian colonies literally 
meaning ‘the evolved,’ meaning that the referenced group had ‘evolved’ out of their native state 
‘into civilization’, and usually implied European education.  In Ruanda-Urundi, the term could 
apply to either Hutu or Tutsi. Used in this thesis to maintain consistency with existing 
scholarship. 
 
Hutu: Kinyarwandan – ethnic group in Rwanda and Burundi, distinct from a clan, with 
several centuries of dynamic lineage. In 1950s Rwanda, Hutu were the majority, approximately 
85%, of the population; usually referenced in combination with Tutsi and Twa. (singular: 
mahutu, plural: bahutu) 
 
Mwami: Kinyarwandan –term for ‘king’ in Ruanda-Urundi (plural: Bami) 
 
Ruanda-Urundi: from 1922-1962, the name of the colonial territory approximately 
equating the twentieth century nation-states of Rwanda and Burundi. Previous to then, part of the 
German colonial region of German East Africa.  
 
Rwanda: the nation-state recognized in 1962 by the United Nations as independent. 
Throughout this thesis, occasionally used as short-hand to maintain focus on central-southern 
area in the contemporary area of Rwanda and not imply the entire colonial mandate. 
 
Trusteeship Council of the United Nations: a council established in chapters XII and XIII 
in the founding Charter of the United Nations. Assigned oversight over Trust Territories (former 
colonies) and the territories’ Administering Authorities (the metropole). Conducted visits to the 
Trust Territories every three years to inspect status and identify progress towards either self-
governance or independence, as the Council deemed feasible.  
 
Tutsi: Kinyarwandan – ethnic group in Rwanda and Burundi, distinct from a clan, with 
several centuries of dynamic lineage. In 1950s Rwanda, Tutsi were the minority, approximately 
15%, of the population, usually referenced in combination with Hutu and Twa.  
 
Uburetwa: Kinyarwandan – a type of taxation via agricultural labor created circa 1870s 
Rwanda that disproportionally was required of Hutu and, according to Jan Vansina, solidified the 
terms of ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ as a class consciousness.  
 
Ubuhake: Kinyarwandan – a relationship of clientship between a patron and client where 
the patron lends property (cows) to the client to care for, and in return the client receives 
protection. In this way, the clientship acted as a social adhesive. The term and practice traces 





Figure 1:Ruanda-Urundi and region, early to mid-20th Century1 
 
                                                   
1 This map only contains places and references relevant to this thesis. Reference Belgium’s annual report to 
the UN from 1954 for the most comprehensive map from this era. Nomenclature and regional boundaries for 
Rwanda are only valid through 1962, after that the government changed many place names, and again in early 
2000s. Jean-Pierre Chrétien, “The Slave Trade in Burundi and Rwanda at the Beginning of German Colonisation, 
1890-1906,” in Slavery in the Great Lakes Region of East Africa, ed. Henri Médard and Shane Doyle, East African 
Studies (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 211; United Nations, “Rapport sur l’administration Belge du 





 Introduction  
 
1955: “These wretched and stupid Hutu dare to challenge [the] total superiority [of the Tutsi]?  
It is unthinkable.” 
  Jean-Paul Harroy2 
Governor from 1955-1961 in Ruanda-Urundi 
 
2001: “We may agree that genocidal violence cannot be understood as rational; yet, we need to 
understand it as thinkable…To show how the unthinkable becomes thinkable is my central 
objective.” 
  Mahmood Mamdani3 
 
There are two main events wherein Rwanda received mainstream international attention 
in the last three decades. The most recent is their adjacent position to North Kivu, the region in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo experiencing the worst outbreaks of the Ebola virus in 
2019-2020.4 The older, but more well-known, is the genocide of 1994. When news of the event 
broke in April 1994, articles and magazine covers swirled with photos of children, machetes, and 
soldiers. The media included maps to identify the small country in the heart of the Great Lakes of 
Africa, nestled between Lake Kivu and mountains scattered with volcanoes. For some, the region 
was only broadly familiar, especially those who followed the careers of Diane Fossey, Jane 
Goodall, Louis Leakey, and Mary Leakey.5  What pictures, maps, and news stories could not 
achieve in the initial period following the genocide was the shattering of the façade that seemed 
to cover the news. During the genocide, from April to July 1994, over half a million people were 
                                                   
2 Jean-Paul Harroy, Rwanda: Souvenirs d’un compagnon de la marche du Rwanda vers la democratie et 
l’independence (Paris: Academie des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, 1984), 235. Here, Harroy uses creative narration to 
make the point that Tutsi in 1955 would have found the concept of Hutu starting – and winning- a revolution 
impossible. Original text: “Ces vils et stupides Hutu, oser nous contester notre totale supériorité? C’est impensable.” 
3 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda 
(Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2002), 8, 18. 
4 Nurith Aizenman, “What Will It Take To Finally End Congo’s Ebola Outbreak In 2020?,” NPR, January 
9, 2020, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/01/09/794675939/what-will-it-take-to-finally-end-congos-
ebola-outbreak-in-2020; Ley Uwera, “Ebola Crisis: Rwanda Reopens Border with DR Congo amid Outbreak,” BBC, 
August 1, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49191715. 
5 Fossey worked in Rwanda and Goodall, Leakey, and Leakey worked in Tanzania during various stages of 




killed.  Participants mostly targeted Tutsi, killing upwards of 75% of them, but they targeted 
thousands of Hutu as well.6 Perpetrators executed ‘intimate killings,’ face-to-face assaults 
requiring the attacker be within arm’s reach of their victim, and did so with machetes as 
weapons. According to news sources, only hyperbolic phrases were sufficient to explain the 
events of the genocide. It was unbelievable. It was the logical result of colonialism, what else 
could one expect? It was “a vision of hell.”7  It was Hell. That being said, in the last 25 years, 
key scholars and activists have successfully worked to change this narrative in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of both the event and process of the genocide.  This thesis aims to do the 
same.   
Much research exists on debating the events from April to July 1994, on the real and 
constructed memory of the events, on the genocide’s existence as a catalyst for the Congo Wars 
(1996 – 2008).8 Out of these works, scholarship has clearly and definitively established that the 
                                                   
6 Alison Liebhafsky Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda (New York : Paris: 
Human Rights Watch ; International Federation of Human Rights, 1999), 1. 
7 Referring to the genocide as hell has been a common comparison and headlines (or articles or photos) rely 
on the term throughout publications, whether during to the genocide or recently, to encapsulate the violence. The 
Time magazine cover from 16 May stated, “There are no devils left in Hell. They are all in Rwanda,” similar to the 
cover from August that referred to the genocide as the “apocalypse.” David Orr, “Inside Rwanda’s Death Camp 
Hell,” The Independent, May 15, 1994, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/inside-rwandas-death-camp-hell-
1436059.html; Jacques Langevin, “TIME Magazine Cover, 1 August 1994,” August 1, 1994, 
http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19940801,00.html; Frank Fournier, “TIME Magazine Cover, 16 May 
1994,” May 16, 1994, http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19940516,00.html; “The Road Out of Hell,” The 
Economist, March 25, 2004, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2004/03/25/the-road-out-of-hell; Jessica 
Phelan, “100 Days of Hell: Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide in Photos,” PRI, April 7, 2014, 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-07/100-days-hell-rwandas-1994-genocide-photos; Jack Picone, “Rwanda: 
Capturing a Vision of Hell,” Al Jazeera, April 7, 2016, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/04/rwanda-
capturing-vision-hell-160407111638338.html; Pauline Holdsworth and Cate Cochran, “‘My Soul Is Still in 
Rwanda’: 25 Years after the Genocide, Roméo Dallaire Still Grapples with Guilt,” CBC, April 7, 2019, 
https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thesundayedition/the-sunday-edition-for-april-7-2019-1.5086008/my-soul-is-still-in-
rwanda-25-years-after-the-genocide-roméo-dallaire-still-grapples-with-guilt-1.5086075. 
8 Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story; Timothy Paul Longman, Memory and Justice in Post-Genocide 
Rwanda (Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Mamdani, When 
Victims Become Killers; Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York City: Columbia 
University Press, 1997); Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a 




Rwandan genocide did not occur because of ancient tribal hatreds.9 Just as Christopher Browning 
argued in Ordinary Men, perpetrators and participants in the Holocaust were not uniquely evil, 
but average members of society. So too, Rwandans were not ‘more evil’ or ‘less civilized’ than 
others in Africa or around the world. These stereotypes are flawed, baseless attempts at 
categorizing this event. Instead, it is helpful to start with the understanding that the Rwandan 
genocide, as do all genocides, occurred as an outcome of historical actions and rational actors 
responding to, against, and between each other. This thesis argues that the process of the 
Rwandan genocide began in 1957 with political debates among Hutu and Tutsi elite that festered 
with the United Nations Trusteeship Visiting Mission later that year. In 1958, these debates 
ignited a divisive debate about power and roles of social groups in Rwanda’s future. The next 
year, a Social Revolution occurred when the debate turned violent. This thesis asserts that by 
studying the major political events of 1957 in south-central Rwanda (then, Ruanda-Urundi) and 
several significant groups of actors who interacted in those events, the roots of the genocide 
become more grounded, more thinkable.  Emphasis on this time and place will illuminate 
Rwandan identity formation, therefore contextualizing power dynamics in Rwanda. Just prior to 
Independence and the genocide. These stories and analysis focus on the ethnic groups Hutu and 
Tutsi to understand identity formation and expression during this formative time. The cities of 
focus in this research are the central cities of Nyanza (the traditional royal capital of Rwanda), 
and Kabgayi (a significant mission of the European Roman Catholic order the Society of the 
Missionaries of Africa [the White Fathers]). With these cities as reference, this thesis discusses 
the perspectives of the national-level actors of United Nations, Belgium, the United States of 
America and the White Fathers to further understand the dynamic of Rwandan identity.  The 
                                                   




specific study of the rhetoric of Rwanda’s nascent democratic political associations – The 
Conseil Supérieur du Pays (the CSP, the Rwandan king’s Tutsi-controlled advisory council) and 
évolués (the Hutu counter-elites), as well as these external national-level actor’s responses, will 
further enable understanding identity by means of a comparative analysis of significant political 
exchanges. This comparative analysis in the larger context of 1957 and the broader trends of 
twentieth century actors in central Rwanda shows that Rwanda had begun the process of 
genocide decades prior to the event itself.10 Discussion of 1950s Rwanda, however, first requires 
a review of the Rwandan ethnic groups and of scholarly literature.  
Hutu and Tutsi: Elaborate Origins 
 
The terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ – in combination with ‘genocide’ – are two prominent 
keywords used in a description of contemporary Rwanda. 11 Frequently, these words are some of 
the only ones used to identify Rwanda, especially in a newspaper headline. With the prevalence 
of these words, it is easy to jump to the conclusion that these groups must have always existed in 
the same manner that they did in the late twentieth century. Divided. At war. Raging brutal 
violence. Unchanging. However, the perception of a binary construction of Hutu versus Tutsi 
                                                   
10 Enumerated as a process by Gregory Stanton in 1996 during his work in the US Department of State, 
these ten stages provide a helpful tool to understand such a destabilizing event as genocide. Other procedural 
understandings do exist, such as Adam Jones discusses. Gregory Stanton, “The Ten Stages of Genocide,” Genocide 
Watch (blog), 1996, https://www.genocidewatch.com/ten-stages-of-genocide; Jones, Genocide, 752–57. 
11 Some examples of journalism discussing the genocide are as follows: NPR, on 12 March 1995, 
simultaneously referred to the Hutu and Tutsi and both “rival tribes” and “clans.” Likewise New York Times, on 9 
April 1994, described the Rwandans as “rival tribal factions wag[ing] vicious street battles.” This terminology 
likewise existed in 1962, when the New York Times again referred to them as “tribal rivals.”  National Geographic, 
in 2014,  made something of a joke out of the confusion by calling attention to the flawed logic of the stereotypes.   
“Rwandan Update” (NPR, March 12, 1995), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1005356; 
William E. Schmidt, “Terror Convulses Rwandan Capital as Tribes Battle,” The New York Times, April 9, 1994, sec. 
World, https://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/09/world/terror-convulses-rwandan-capital-as-tribes-battle.html; Special 
to The New York Times, “TERRORIST TRIBE WORRIES RWANDA; Ousted Watusi Continuing Attacks as 
Freedom Nears Toll Put at 5,000 Africans Attacks on Decrease,” The New York Times, July 1, 1962, sec. Archives, 
https://www.nytimes.com/1962/07/01/archives/terrorist-tribe-worries-rwanda-ousted-watusi-continuing-attacks-
as.html; Peter Gwin and David Guttenfelder, “Revisiting the Rwandan Genocide: Hutu or Tutsi?,” National 





during the genocide was a product not only of twentieth century colonialism, but also of at least 
three centuries of social transformation.  
There is a kernel of truth to the idea that the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa ethnic groups have an 
‘ancient existence.’  As Jan Vansina has proven, the words ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ themselves mean 
more than a category, and they have existed since at least the mid-seventeenth century. Since 
then, it appears that the terms went through several waves of social and linguistic use and these 
iterations, in combination with colonialism, resulted in the power dynamics discussed here. 
Initially, ‘Tutsi’ was a term self-selected by only some herders, whereas Hutu was “a demeaning 
term that alluded to rural boorishness or loutish behavior used by the elite.”12 Some also used the 
term ‘Hutu’ to refer to a servant or an otherwise subordinate, even if that person was Tutsi. 
Additionally, some used it to categorize foreigners.13 As early as the 1600s, ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Hutu’ 
had very specific linguistic meanings and social use. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, partially due to an adjustment of the organization of the 
military, the terms took on another meaning. This revision formally institutionalized the Hutu-
Tutsi binary, thus showing the beginnings of contemporary understanding of the terms. In the 
mid-1700s, ‘Tusti’ referred to combatants in the military. As the combatants tended to come 
from the ruling elite, who were also Tutsi, these two groups reinforced the naming convention. 
Likewise, the opposite of combatants are non-combatants, whom people referred to as ‘Hutu.’ 
The non-combatants tended to come from farming communities. Thus, the communities who 
supplied the people placed into each of these respective military roles came to take on the names 
                                                   
12 Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2004), 134. 
13 Vansina, 135; Jean-Pierre Chrétien, The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History (New 




themselves of the roles.14 Hutus, as non-combatants, were the opposite of Tutsis, the fighters, 
just as farmers were opposite of herders.  
In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, the terms saw the next wave of definition, again 
further institutionalizing the dichotomy. The king, mwami Rwabugiri, imposed forced labor onto 
those with farmland as a type of taxation for using that land. However, some Hutu were the 
farmers and Tutsi were the herders, this policy of uburetwa only influenced Hutu.15 This policy 
was a source of significant unrest and rebellion. These rebellions became the background of the 
tumultuous transition of royalty in the mid 1890s, including a coup. During all of this, the new 
king, Musinga, would seek stability, and aim to acquire it, through a partnership with Germany.  
Tracing back the linguistic and social origins of Hutu and Tutsi begins to show the 
layered complexity of Rwandan society’s evolution with respect to these ethnic groups and 
provides vital background to understanding the relationships the Rwandan government leveraged 
during the genocide. However, this lineage does not answer what served as the main structure of 
social organization, at least up until German colonial incursion in 1897.  What served that 
function, as Vansina and David Newbury’s research shows, were clans.16 Prior to the twentieth 
century, Rwanda had eighteen clans that formed the overall identification and social structure of 
society.17 Clans were inclusive of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.18 Each clan varied from the next based 
on the social, geographic, or military needs, but within the clans the social expectations of Hutu, 
                                                   
14 Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, 135. 
15 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 404; Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 66; 
Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, 130, 134, 192. 
16 Besides clans, an alternate form of social organization was alignment to a strong military leader. Alison 
Des Forges, “Judicial Archives of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 11 February 1997” (1997), 
https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/audio.shtml. See also,  David S. Newbury, “The Clans of Rwanda: 
An Historical Hypothesis,” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 50, no. 4 (1980): 389–403. 
17 Des Forges, Judicial Archives of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 11 February 1997. 




Tutsi, Twa still held. Thus, the combination stitched together an intricate socio-political system 
that Rwanda’s future colonial rulers would misunderstand and ultimately manipulate.  
Reviewing recent historiography proves that clans were the dominant social structure but 
also that the notions of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa existed and had meaning, and it is clear that people 
utilized those categories. Reviewing culture again at Independence, ethnic groups (having 
replaced clans) were the dominant organization.  Just as the meaning of Hutu and Tutsi evolved 
as social classifications, so did the social organization.  It seems that most of the social 
classifications in preceding centuries emerged due to internal influences. The shift from clans to 
ethnic groups, however, resulted from external influences. Therefore, broadly considering 
external influences on Rwanda throughout the twentieth century can begin to illuminate this shift 
in social organization that later would include identity formation as Rwanda proceeded into 
Independence and out of colonial rule.  
Colonial Transition 
Rwanda first experienced European influence in the late nineteenth century after the 
Congress of Berlin divided central Africa into colonial territories for Britain, Germany, and 
Belgium. Germany imposed political power while French missionaries imposed Catholic 
doctrine.19 During the First World War, military victories switched parts of German East Africa 
to Belgian rule and saw them renamed Ruanda-Urundi. Belgians significantly manipulated 
Rwandan traditional social structures for their own political and economic benefit.  The crux of 
this involved viewing members of Tutsi social group as superior to Hutu and Twa, and then 
transforming this belief into rhetoric, legal status, and educational opportunity for Tutsi.20  
                                                   
   19J.J. Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide: Catholic Politics and Ethnic Discourse in the Late Colonial 
Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Appendix 1, “Timeline”. Initially, most of the White Fathers were 
French but later they came from other European countries, significantly Swizterland.  
   20 Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 




With the creation of the United Nations after the Second World War, the new 
organization began overseeing Belgian control of Rwanda as a Trust Territory. The UN instated 
the goal of future independence. Belgium realized that continued manipulation of Tutsi (14% of 
population) over Hutu (84%) and Twa (1%) would not lead to a predictable or stable 
decolonization.21 Thus, Belgium began shifting their favor from Tutsi to Hutu. 
Power dynamics began to shift within Rwanda just as colonial rulers did, too. Tutsi, not 
only in power during colonialism but also as kings in pre-colonial Rwanda, feared losing their 
long-held political control and their recently provided privileges.22 Meanwhile Hutu, exasperated 
with subjugation since even before European colonial contact, seized the opportunity for control. 
Groups formed, publishing arguments and goals, some forming into political parties.  To provide 
structure to the move towards independence, Belgium introduced structural changes to Rwanda’s 
political system, and created the Conseil Supérieur du Pays. Similarly, the White Fathers (who 
themselves were also shifting their favor from Tutsi to Hutu) created an agricultural cooperative 
to provide training and resources for farmers. While not the first Rwandan political discussions 
to occur, it was from these groups that political dialogue featured more prominently. These 
political debates specifically included “Mise au Point” and “the Manifesto of the Bahutu,” and 
they entered the international stage.23 
                                                   
Hypothesis. The discussion of this transformation and manipulation is a significant portion of Mamdani’s argument 
in this book.  
21 Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide, 273 and Appendix 1.  
22 David Newbury, “Precolonial Burundi and Rwanda: Local Loyalties, Regional Royalties,” The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 34, no. 2 (2001): 255–314. This is a complicated statement for 
two reasons. First, scholars have recorded the Nyiginya Clan as the ruling clan of royalty in Rwanda since the 
seventeenth century. While clan does not equal ethnic group, due to the rise of the Nyiginya Clan’s power that 
paralleled the use of ‘Tutsi’ to denotate power and elitism, the clan’s identity become one of a Tutsi clan.  (Vansina, 
Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, 37. ) Second, the king was in society but not of society, 
being an “intermediary” between several social categories but not within any of them as being the king was a sacred 
position above these categories. (David Newbury, “What Role Has Kingship?,” in The Land Beyond the Mists: 
Essays on Identity and Authority in Precolonial Congo and Rwanda (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009), 250.) 
23 This is the full name of the manifesto, in English. “Ba” is the Bantu linguistic prefix that denotes plural, 




In 1959, when the Tutsi king died suddenly and mysteriously in Usumbura, Burundi 
under Belgian purview, Tutsi and Hutu political ambitions exploded.24 Both Hutu and Tutsi 
created political parties, some moderate and others extreme, all vying for power. Power grabs 
initiated a process of revolution under the guise of democracy. A Hutu party – the political and 
popular majority – achieved victory. But freedom from colonial rule in July 1962 did not end 
agitations. Tensions, competition, and retaliation escalated into diasporas through the 1960s and 
1970s, the 1990 Civil War, the 1994 genocide, and the twenty-first century Congo Wars.   
In September 1957, the UN Trusteeship Council had scheduled an advisory visit and, 
aiming to influence that visit, the CSP wrote “Mise au Point” describing their views on the status 
of Rwanda. Dissatisfied with their perspectives, the évolués wrote a response, “the Hutu 
Manifesto,” and sent it to the Belgian Governor-General Harroy. These written discussions 
illuminate in Rwandans’ own words their preferences and objectives regarding their present and 
future.  Since these two documents are self-reflective and so analysis of them, as well as 
Governor-General Harroy’s memoirs, United Nations trusteeship reports, United States 
Department of State records, Rwandan scholarly collections, and other primary sources, can lead 
to a deeper comprehension of Rwandan’s understanding of themselves and how this converges 
with the genocide. The 1950s was a watershed time in Rwanda where people discussed and 
tested what was against what could be. Primary sources, especially from 1957, highlight this 
tension and transition, and provide an opportunity to view alterations in Rwandan identity, both 
by their own writings and how other actors responded to them. These writings also show how the 
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process of genocide began at this time, connecting the last pre-Independence years to the 
genocide. 
Exceptionalism of Sources 
Before concluding this introduction with a brief historiography and roadmap of the thesis, 
the exceptionalism of the sources needs to be acknowledged. The sources used in this thesis are 
valuable because they are a snapshot in time of sects of Rwandan society in their own words. 
However, they reflect pockets of the Rwandan population. The CSP were a mere thirty 
individuals, mostly Tutsi, in a newly formed advisory council who worked for the king. Even 
acknowledging that Tutsi comprised a small portion of the population, only a small number of 
them would ultimately work for the king, whether in the CSP or in other senior roles. Likewise, 
there is a similar issue with the document the évolués wrote. Only some Hutu received higher 
education that would enable them to write an academic argument fluently in a foreign language. 
Thus, neither of these sources can fairly or reasonably claim to speak for all Tutsi or all Hutu in 
Rwanda.  
The fact that the Rwandan sources used here are in French also requires some 
explanation. First, there are other sources available in Kinyarwandan (Rwanda’s native 
language), but the author determined this language barrier too significant for the parameters of 
this project and instead focused on translations of French sources. Second, the fact that a 
significant number of sources exist in French (and not Kinyarwandan or even Flemish, 
Belgium’s other primary language) speaks to the original authors’ audiences, generally showing 
an audience that projects externally and international – towards colonial leaders and the UN – 
instead of internally – towards Rwandans. Arguably a document only in Kinyarwandan might 
only have an intended audience of Rwandans, regardless of ethnic group, possibly even 




further shows the exceptionalism of the CSP and évolués writings. By the means of the chosen 
language, these authors intended their audiences to be either highly educated Rwandans or 
Western Europeans. Thus, not only are the groups self-selecting, but the chosen language of 
communication highlights further their exceptionalism.  
Despite the clear exceptionalism of the sources, they are still valuable to this research. 
Historical studies should aim to use all reasonable, available resources to analyze past events, 
even if there may be known flaws or biases. Indeed, in the field of African History where 
scholars utilize both oral and written sources, this is a helpful reminder that no source is ideal 
and that all sources require interrogation. Nevertheless, even though these authors belonged to 
select populations and wrote in a European language does not disregard them as viable sources to 
analyze Rwandan history. These documents have, by means of their capture in writing, recorded 
arguments that enable contemporary researchers to hear from Rwandan voices. This value 
outweighs their exceptionalism.  
Historiography 
Comparing Rwanda at Independence to Rwanda during the genocide shows the vast 
changes experienced during the adjoining four decades.  Rwanda’s social structures (the primary 
means of social organization) completed the shift from clans to ethnic groups and the leader of 
socio-political power inverted between these two events.25 Rwandans violently created a 
Republic independent from Belgian colonial rule, and experienced multiple diasporas that 
resulted in a local civil war and genocide. But how did these events happen? How did Rwanda 
shift from its culture in 1950s to that of 1990s?   
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There have not been significant works in English dedicated solely to Independence or 
connections of early post-colonial Rwanda to the genocide. (Scholars having had similar 
discussions primarily seem to have had them only in French.) However, significant scholarly 
discourse exists on pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Rwanda. Key pre-colonial scholars 
and works are: Jan Vansina, on the use of oral tradition and the legitimacy of the African studies 
as a historical field (Antecedents to Modern Rwanda); and David Newbury, on the role of kings 
and their chronology (Land Beyond the Mists and “Bringing the Peasants Back In”).26  
There are many works on colonial and post-colonial Rwanda, especially the genocide. 
These scholarly works include Mahmood Mamdani’s When Victims Become Killers, which 
assesses the Hutu transition from social peasant to perpetrators of the genocide and Gérard 
Prunier’s The Rwanda Crisis, which reviews Rwandan history in brief in order to provide 
context to his detailed description of the genocide.27 This cohort’s discourse also includes René 
Lemarchand’s Rwanda and Burundi, the first historical and political review of the two nations, 
and the requisite updates in Jean-Pierre Chrétien’s The Great Lakes of Africa, the comprehensive 
survey of the region from pre-history to contemporary events.28  
While there are some scholars who bridge events across pre-colonial and post-colonial 
Rwanda, some focus on a governmental, monarchial level (such as Alison Des Forges’ Defeat is 
the Only Bad News).29 Other works, due to their publication date, do not extend far enough into 
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contemporary history to draw connections past the colonial era or connect it to the Rwandan 
genocide (such as Catharine Newbury’s Cohesion of Oppression).30  However, works such as 
these still provide vital context for study across Rwanda and highlight regional-specific studies 
that combat the notion that Rwanda is homogenous. Finally, there are two religious histories – 
Ian Linden’s Church and Revolution in Rwanda (1977) and J.J. Carney’s Rwanda before the 
Genocide (2016) – that both discuss the history of the missionary work of the Society of the 
Missionaries of Africa (White Fathers) in Rwanda over the twentieth century.  
This thesis seeks to connect Mamdani’s work discussing the transformation of Hutu from 
the suppressed to the suppressor to Prunier’s approach of the genocide as a result of colonialism. 
It also seeks to advance approaches of Vansina, Lemarchand, and Chrétien also drawing from 
Linden and Carney, continuing to bridge the time of Rwanda’s self-rule with European religious 
and political intervention with that of its establishment as a modern nation. It also expands upon 
scholarly discussions of “Mise au Point” and “Hutu Manifesto,” which up until this point have 
discussed these documents but not thoroughly analyzed them. References to these two political 
texts in the current scholarship are limited to only a paragraph over the course of an entire 
book.31 This thesis challenges these limited discussions by other scholars by initiating analysis 
on “Mise au Point” and “Hutu Manifesto” and arguing that this analysis provides valuable 
insights to furthering discussion of Rwandan political identity. However, relevant literature is not 
limited to regional scholarship. A review of literature on the United Nations and how these 
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works are in conversation with Africanist works further contextualizes this thesis’ discussion of 
1950’s Rwanda in the era following the end of the Second World War.  
Recent scholarship on the UN’s structure, purpose, and action does not agree on its 
institutional origins or to what meant to be engaged with the colonial world. However, scholars 
do agree that the UN was an imagined community and significant global actor in the twentieth 
century, and the desires of member nation-states ultimately limited the power of the UN.32  
M. Todd Bennett focuses on public’s perception of the UN during the Second World War 
and argues that the UN’s existence as a cultural construct was an “imagined community.”33 This 
construct enabled its malleability, therefore allowing the American government to shape its 
construct to the popular psyche for the Allies strategic advantage during the war.34 This 
psychological manipulation, Bennett argues, literally shifted how people perceived the UN. 
Through this effort, their imagined construct of the UN transformed from isolationist and 
xenophobic to part of the “family of nations.”35 Mark Mazower argues that the origins of the UN, 
were a “way of imagining a new world organization.”36 He describes the UN as a “product of 
evolution not revolution,” essentially an extension of empire first with British then with 
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increasingly American influence.37 He challenges what he identifies as anachronistic descriptions 
of the UN. He expresses that simply because contemporary scholars, and even citizens, view the 
UN as a bastion of idealism and internationalism, that does not mean this understanding is truly 
congruent with the UN’s origins or how the nation-state actors within the UN understood its 
creation.38 He further draws attention to just how imagined this community is when he identifies 
several perspectives of the UN’s Charter, stating that some members perceived it full of hope as 
an idealistic contract, while others saw it as “promissory notes…never intended to be cashed.”39 
William Bain also connects UN history to Anglo-Saxon historical roots. He asserts that 
the British first utilized the trusteeship system, and once created then worked its way into the 
League of Nations and United Nation’s foundational structure.40 Bain elaborates on the British 
trusteeship system (later incorporated in League mandates and then UN trusteeships), asserting 
that trusteeship is the structural manifestation of the White Man’s Burden.41 It is emplacing into 
an institutional system that the ‘civilized’ group were under a moral obligation to teach the 
‘uncivilized’ until they transformed into or otherwise ‘proved’ their ‘civility’ (if such a thing was 
even possible in this relationship).42 Mazower, in his follow-up text to his 2009 work, seems to 
agree.43  He moves past origins of the UN and explores “the organized cooperation among 
nations” that led to not only the UN but other international organizations and what remains of 
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them today.44 Specifically, Mazower asserts that the UN Charter does not in actuality support 
colonial independence. Instead, it is a verbose veneer covering the system of colonial rule to give 
the impression of change in place of institutional reform.45  
Bennett told a tale of manipulation, Mazower one of pessimism, and Bain one of British 
influence, but these are not the only scholarly views on the history of the UN. Sunil Amrith and 
Glenda Sluga, like their peers, challenge the popular narrative of the UN while also articulating 
several new historical discussions of the organization. In their scholarship, they assert a fresh 
interpretation of the UN’s role in history.46 First, they challenge Bain’s argument and assert that 
the UN’s intellectual history is not only British or Western in scope, but instead universalist. 
Second, they emphasize the “complexity and contradiction” of the UN’s history, stating that 
calling out this tension between international and nation-states is a more accurate narrative for 
this organization.47 By recognizing that “the interests of sovereign states” had limited previous 
conversations, this then enables future discussions to fill in blind spots.48 Third, they argue that 
the UN has always placed an emphasis on – and thus successfully has reshaped -  social elements 
of international society, as illustrated through the creation of WHO and UNICEF, for example.49 
Lastly, they argue that the UN “is a historiographical actor in its own right,” not just for its own 
study but also as it worked to legitimize other areas of the world and convince others of their 
perceived worthiness of historical study.50 Rightfully so, they remind fellow scholars that “the 
tension between nationalism and internationalism …is at the very heart of the UN’s intellectual 
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history, even if the former almost always prevailed.”51 The identification of this tension is what 
makes Amrith and Sluga’s article stand out among their peers. By modeling a non-binary 
historical discussion of the UN, they further reveal its complex nature. 
Considering the recognition of human rights in this complex relationship of the UN and 
its function in international history furthers this historical conversation. Peter Stearns examines 
this relationship, considering how each internal action and human rights have both informed the 
other within the context of recent global history.  He focuses on the modern era since this is 
when “human rights arguments become important enough, but also pervasive enough, for 
societies to quarrel over them.”52 Despite this importance, the products of human rights 
discussed were not as fruitful as hoped. Stearns points out, like each of his peers, that the 
priorities of the nation-state overpowered that of the UN’s Charter, as displayed when “[the 
United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union] balked at coming on too strong in the 
human rights domain, and this resulted in statements that were deliberately weak and vague.” 53 
Even though the nation-states frequently overshadowed the UN, Stearns still asserts the very 
mentioning of human rights in the Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
still indicated progress. Codifying ideas in writing resulted in legitimization of human rights was 
a point of discussion for member nation-states, and any nation-state who was a member of the 
UN implicitly understood that their agreement to join the UN meant they agreed to abide by 
these proclamations.54  
Samuel Moyn adds to this conversation of the history of human rights. As part of his 
broader thesis that the contemporary understanding of human rights did not enter society until 
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the mid-1970s, he argues that the UN’s focus was not on human rights, much less not on 
decolonization. He even asserts that decolonization occurred in spite of, not because of, the UN’s 
work.55 While he states that it was at the UN where “the intersection of anticolonialism and 
human rights occurred,” he also caveats to say the discussion of human rights was contingent on 
the structure of the nation-state, not an international organization.56  
 This notion of the power of the nation-state that Moyn emphasizes is a common theme 
for each of these scholars. Although communicated in various ways, each argues that the nation-
state had greater influence than and over the UN’s supranational idealist structure.  Given this 
consensus, it is helpful to consider this scholarly cohort in light of how scholars on colonial 
Rwanda integrate and discuss the UN. Broadly speaking, the trend with works on Rwanda is that 
scholars tend to not focus on the UN as a historical actor, but when they do, they credit the UN 
as more influence than Belgium, Rwanda’s administering power.  
The two scholarly works that tell the history of the White Fathers Catholic order in 
Ruanda-Urundi both only discuss the UN as a necessary but ancillary actor. Ian Linden and Jane 
Linden in their 1977 work speak only briefly about the UN. For example, one reference includes 
the UN as a means to describe Belgium’s relationship with Ruanda-Urundi, but despite this 
declared relationship that implied that Belgium had a goal for the trusteeship to independence, it 
“was slow to set the wheels turning.”57 J.J. Carney’s work, the other scholarship on the Catholic 
order of priests, similarly expresses tensions between Belgium and the UN, only really 
incorporating the UN out of necessity.58 While identifying this power struggle between the 
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international organization and the nation-state is both valid and important, their incorporation of 
this relationship does not extend into analysis, although this seems likely due to the indirect 
topical relevance for them.  
 While Gérard Prunier expresses similarly brief comments on the UN, Mahmood 
Mamdani and René Lemarchand significantly incorporate and emphasize the UN into their 
colonial portions of their historical discussions. Prunier only references the UN a few times and 
briefly each time. One of the few detailed references he incorporates emphasizes that a new 
Rwandan political party that aligned with the goals of “Mise au Point” was receiving financial 
support from Communist countries on the UN Trusteeship Council.59 While important to identify 
to enable an understanding the international political networks at play in this complex 
relationship, Prunier mentions this also akin to trivia before moving onto his next point. Thus, 
Prunier’s incorporation of the UN into his historical narrative is akin to the scholarship on the 
White Fathers – it is superficial and referential. However, Mamdani and Lemarchand’s 
incorporation of the UN into their works is more substantial. While Mamdani only briefly 
mentions the UN during Rwanda’s colonial era, he does so by giving it credit for Rwanda’s 
decolonization through democratic processes. In fact, he specifically circumvents Belgium 
saying, “Although administered by Belgium…Rwanda was a UN trust territory,” implying that 
the UN held the influence, not Belgium. 60 This qualitative statement is more than just a 
description of the UN or its actions, it stakes a claim on the UN’s actions. Lemarchand advances 
this treatment of the UN when he, over several iterations in his text, discusses the UN in a similar 
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way. Lemarchand attributes and somewhat praises the UN as being an “accelerator of change” in 
Ruanda-Urundi and then berates Belgium for its behavior.61 He articulates why the UN was a 
force of change (due to its act of setting a date of independence and forcing Belgium to 
incorporate democratic processes) and why he berated Belgium (due to its poor and unstable 
relationship with the UN). Then Lemarchand does something his peers do not do at all – he 
defends Belgium’s actions. After explaining how Belgium failed in its duties, he then explains 
Belgium’s perspective and why it acted as it did during the days of the social revolution in 
1959.62 Therefore, the difference between Lemarchand’s work and his Africanist peers is that he 
is the most successful at teasing out the complexity of the relationship between the UN and 
Belgium. He does not shy away from assertions, but he also works to exam his assertions. This 
examination takes his work to an analytic level that uniquely explores the role of the UN in 
Rwanda and its relationship with Belgium. 
 Reviewing this selection of Rwandan scholarship shows that the methods used by the 
broader scholarship as it addresses the inherent tension in the UN proves to be true, but the 
inverse plays out in the colonial relationships of Ruanda-Urundi. This scholarship highlights the 
relationship between membership of the nation-states and the international goal of the UN. The 
additional aid of this scholarly overview is that it contextualizes the discussion of power 
regarding the 1957 Visiting Mission to Ruanda-Urundi Although theory expresses that the 
nation-state overrode the UN, analyzing Ruanda-Urundi as a case study shows the opposite. As 
this thesis shows, the UN remained stronger than Belgium at least going into the 1950s.  
                                                   
61 René Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 107–9. 





 This introduction has provided an overview of the argument of the thesis, which is 
to discuss identity formation of Hutu évolués and the Tutsi-majority CSP in Kabgayi and Nyanza 
in 1957, and to relate this identity formation to assist in better understanding the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994 by displaying it as the beginning of the process of genocide.63 This introduction 
has also included an overview of the nuanced origins of the terms and social application of 
‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ from 1600s through the early 1900s. Additionally, this introduction specified 
the key primary sources this thesis will discuss, as well as the inherent exceptionalism and value 
of those sources. Lastly, this introduction reviewed relevant historiography to position this thesis 
within the work of the scholarly community. This background is necessary to understand the 
following historical narrative, which traces from approximately 1900 until 1962.   
The thesis progresses by discussing the following actors and their interactions. After 
providing twentieth century background by discussing the White Fathers in Kabgayi (chapter 
one), this paper will then discuss the Rwandan CSP in Nyanza (chapter two) and the 
simultaneous growth of the Rwandan évolués in Kabgayi (chapter three) and, in turn, describe 
each group’s priorities and actions, thus enabling a discussion of identity formation of these 
groups. Following discussion of these actions, the focus will broaden, incorporating the 
responses and impressions of the United Nations and Belgium during the same time (chapter 
four). The Conclusion will synthesize the analysis to provide a starting point for future studies 
focusing on the 1994 genocide.  
To understand the crucial late 1950s means to understand the various actors interacting 
simultaneously. The main historical actors interacting in 1957 are the Missionaries of Africa 
(White Fathers), the Tutsi ethnic group, the Hutu ethnic group, and international state-level 
                                                   




actors (the United Nations, Belgium, and the United States). Due to the complexity of these 
interactions, this thesis identifies and analyzes the history and behavior of each group in turn. 
Isolating each group while also progressively layering and synthesizing preceding explanations 
allowed for appropriate analysis for each actor that with each additional actor complicated but 
informed the events of Rwanda’s pre-Independence history. Discussion of the 1950s also 
requires recognition that Rwandan society did not begin with colonialization and 
acknowledgement that elements of Rwandan society that existed at the turn of the twentieth 
century became elements of colonial rule. Recognizing the history of the terms Hutu and Tutsi 
displays that while these are dynamic terms, they decidedly exist in the Modern Era. This is the 
beginning of the rejection of the mistaken explanation of the Rwanda genocide as an “ancient 
tribal hatred”.64 
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Chapter 1:  The White Fathers in Kabgayi, 1900 – 1956 
 
Fourth Commandment: Honor your mother and your father, that you may have a 
long life in the land which the Lord, your God, is giving you. 
Exodus 20:12 65 
 
 The White Fathers, or the Missionaries of Africa, to use their formal name, are a Roman-
Catholic order. The White Fathers are a male religious order (referred to Fathers) and are a 
community within the hierarchical structure of the Catholic church. While they are subordinate 
to the larger Church, they have autonomy to the extent that actions fall within their directed 
mission. The White Fathers focus on the spiritual value of charity, determined by the founder, 
Charles Lavigerie. Charity, in conjunction with the principles of the Catholic Church, serve as 
the doctrine to dictate and limit their actions in the conduct of duties within their larger religious 
and secular geographical communities.  Lavigerie founded the group in 1868 with the goal for 
the order to evangelize Africa, beginning with his diocese in Algeria. The White Fathers received 
their nickname due to their uniform comprising of white robes.66 Lavigerie gained the approval 
of the Holy Father (commonly referred to outside the Catholic Church simply as the Pope) to 
move into the African continent.  
The history of the White Fathers in Ruanda-Urundi begins in the early twentieth century. 
It starts when the White Fathers entered the area known as the nation-state of Rwanda, but at that 
time was combined with Burundi under German colonial rule as Ruanda-Urundi. This chapter 
discusses the significant social actions of the White Fathers in the mid-1950s – the celebration of 
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the twentieth-fifth anniversary of the mwami of Rwanda and the establishment of an agricultural 
cooperative that would become a tool for Hutu to wield political power in the early 1960s. But 
reaching into the 1960s and talking of the Hutu as having power to wield is getting ahead. It is 
first important to talk about the White Fathers – who they were, what they did, and how they 
interacted with Rwandans – before talking about anything that Rwandans did (as later chapters 
will show, the Hutu and Tutsi both staked claims in this process). Reviewing and analyzing the 
history of the White Fathers in Rwanda is important because it helps to explain some of the ways 
that European colonial incursion occurred through religious communities. Examination of the 
work, agency, and power of the White Fathers is a necessary foundation to make sense of the 
discussion of the rise of Hutu agency via education against the Rwandan-created but European-
manipulated Tutsi. The clashing of the Hutu and Tutsi in the late 1950s led to the conditions that 
began the process of the genocide, made manifest in 1994. The presence and involvement of the 
White Fathers, while neither a sole factor nor deterministic, aided the Belgian colonial 
manipulation of Rwandan politics, religion, and culture. As this manipulation became social 
stratification and evolved into violent bifurcation, these became the conditions where the process 
of genocide could cultivate. Acknowledging the works of Ian Linden and Jane Linden (1977) 
and J.J. Carney (2016), this chapter builds on their histories of the White Fathers in Ruanda-
Urundi but further contextualizes the religious order within the colonial rule during the twentieth 
century by weaving their story into the story of the other peoples who were also in Rwanda.  
In 1900, the White Fathers first entered Rwanda to begin their missionary work. It is with 
a deep sense of irony that, upon their entry, they brought with them their Catholic doctrine, 
including the Ten Commandments, as foundational moral imperatives. This was ironic because it 
was this same logic of exclusive worship enumerated in the Commandments that the Fathers 
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intended to use to convert Rwandans, but instead mwami Musinga used it to limit their audiences 
for preaching. Musinga prohibited the Fathers to preach to Tutsi. Instead, he restricted their 
evangelization to Hutu and Twa. Once the Fathers agreed to these conditions, Musinga allowed 
them access to the country. The Tutsi were followers of the mwami alone and he allowed no 
other loyalty besides him, the same logic of the Fourth Commandment.67 Apart from the 
religious preaching, Musinga did agree to and expressed interest in learning to read and write. He 
could see that literacy was a required political and military skill he needed to have in order to 
deal with the European presence.68 
Musinga’s move to limit the White Father’s access to the population was the first 
indication that he did not welcome them into his kingdom. To further emphasize this hierarchy of 
power, he tried to put the White Fathers into Bugoyi, northwest Rwanda, or Gisaka, east 
Rwanda, but the White Fathers insisted on their mission having a closer proximity to the center 
of the court’s power in Nyanza. Eventually, the two parties made a compromise and the priests 
settled into Save hill and Mara, in the south of Rwanda.69  Once they received and settled their 
habitation, the White Fathers began their missionary work, acquisition of power, and adjustment 
of Rwandan society.70 The process of gaining power did not happen overnight nor was it easy. 
Instead, the White Fathers used several methods. Their efforts of evangelization, political 
manipulation, and social justice work provided their increased power, and thus capability to 
                                                   
67 Alison Liebhafsky Des Forges, Defeat Is The Only Bad News: Rwanda under Musinga, 1896 -1931 
(Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011), 29. 
68 Des Forges, 29. It seems that Musinga did become literate in Kinyarwandan. Jean-Paul Harroy includes 
one of Musinga’s letters in his memoir. Harroy, Rwanda, 60. 
69 Des Forges, Defeat Is the Only Bad News, 28. 
70 This scope of this thesis does not address presence or role of slavery in Rwandan society at the time of 
European colonial incursion. For a discussion on slavery in Rwanda and Burundi, and the White Fathers altercation 




influence, as they successfully worked to reshape culture and provided a narrative of identity to 
Rwandans.  
Evangelization 
During the first few decades of their missionary work, the White Fathers experienced 
highs and lows, adversity and successes that show the various degrees that Rwandans accepted 
them into society. They received threats from the Rwandan Royal Court in Nyanza. They 
witnessed huge spiritual celebrations after a fruitful harvest. Most importantly, they experienced 
Hutu’s perception of them as protectors take hold.71 This latter experience shows the integration 
of the White Fathers into the fabric of Rwandan society. Prior to European incursion, wealthy 
Rwandans occupied the position of protector in a patron-client relationship, but with the missions 
the Fathers came to replace this role, in part.   Hutu were the largest population in the missions 
and, within some social scenarios, were used to using Tutsi to gain protection from or during 
vulnerable social scenarios. With their presence in the missions, Hutu began to look to the priests 
for social protection from Tutsi. Thus, these change in actions began to weave the White Fathers 
into the fabric of society.  
The struggles at the start of the twentieth century when the White Fathers entered the 
court in 1900 gave way to a situation more congruent with what the Fathers had hoped for during 
their initial arrival. They gained the confidence of Hutu and earned a reputation for being 
dependable.72  Twenty years after their arrival, in The Annual Report from 1923, notes that “the 
supernatural purpose of our work is known by everyone, and the prejudices of the beginning 
have given way to trust. […] It is the people who now declare themselves as catechumens or 
Christians, without incurring the king’s disgrace […] [and they are no longer] exposing 
                                                   
71 Linden and Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, 52–53; Des Forges, Defeat Is the Only Bad 
News, 28–31. 
72 Des Forges, Defeat Is the Only Bad News, 28–29. 
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themselves to the risk of being stripped of their belongings.”73 While this correspondence to 
Rome was likely working to justify the priests’ presence in the region, if not defend perceived 
successes, the details expressed also describe a marked improvement in evangelization practices 
from their initial arrival in Nyanza.   Ulterior motives aside, their persistence was paying off, and 
so the priests continued to focus on conversions.  
As the 1920s flowed into the 1930s, the White Fathers were not only gaining power 
through their actions in their missions, but also through their relationship with Belgian colonial 
leaders. Through the combined power of this partnership, the priests oversaw several significant 
shifts in Rwandan society. The first significant shift occurred when the White Fathers convinced 
Belgians to allow them to run schools in lieu of Belgian operation of classrooms.74 The second 
shift occurred when the White Fathers worked with Belgian colonial representatives to depose 
mwami Musinga. With his long-standing resistance to Christianity, both specifically to 
conversion himself and generally to the White Father’s presence, Musinga blocked the White 
Fathers from increasing their political standing. As this discussion proves, after the deposition, 
the White Fathers both displayed their power in doing so and gained more power.75 
Education 
White Fathers delivered the first social shift during the 1930s in the form of education. 
The modification in education that they implemented capitalized on a Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy that 
also manipulated the identity of each for political purposes. Their reliance on education as a 
catalyst for change harkens back to their origins. At their formation, they received inspiration 
                                                   
73 A.G.M.Afr., “Les ‘Bahutu,’” 2.1 1923, Chroniques et Rapports Annuels, General Archives of the Society 
of Missionaries of Africa. Original text: Le but surnaturel de notre oeuvre est connu de tous, et les préjugés des 
débuts ont fait place à la confiance; […] C’est que les gens peuvent maintenant se declarer catéchumènes ou 
chrétiens, sans en courir la disgrace du Roi … et ainsi s’exposer au risqué d’être dépouillés de leurs biens…” 
74 Linden and Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda. 




from the history of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits), who had conducted extensive missionary work 
on several continents in previous centuries. The White Fathers did seem to gain inspiration from 
and to emulate the Jesuit style, to include creating a written language for Kinyarwandan, just as 
Jesuits and other priests had done with indigenous peoples throughout North and South 
America.76 A system of writing, however, was only the start of the educational reforms. The 
written word cemented the perceived social dichotomy that Musinga had used to divide the 
White Father’s evangelization in an attempt to reduce the priests as a threat of power. Instead, 
the roles of Hutu and Tutsi, more malleable in the early twentieth century, supplied Rwandans 
with a narrative of identity and the educational system shaped and cemented them.  
While Musinga’s approval of exclusionary access indicated his adherence to social roles 
within Rwanda, the Europeans brought perceptions of their own to the process of colonization 
that then set the tone for processes of education. There seem to be two key origins for 
European’s views. The first heralds from the geological discovery by Europeans of the source of 
the Nile River to the Great Lakes.77 This record from John Hanning Speke describes his 
perceptions of Africans throughout his travels of tracing the Nile River from Tanzania to Egypt:  
“I profess accurately to describe native Africa—Africa in those places where it has 
not received the slightest impulse, whether for good or evil, from European 
civilization. If the picture be a dark one, we should, when contemplating these sons 
of Noah, try and carry our mind back to that time when our poor elder brother Ham 
was cursed by his father, and condemned to be the slave of both Shem and Japheth; 
for as they were then, so they appear to be now—a strikingly existing proof of the 
Holy Scriptures. But one thing must be remembered: Whilst the people of Europe 
and Asia were blessed by communion with God […] the Africans were excluded 
from this dispensation, and consequently have no idea of an overruling Providence 
[…]. Whatever, then, may be said against them for being too avaricious or too 
destitute of fellow-feeling, should rather reflect on ourselves, who have been so 
                                                   
76 Linden and Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, 29–30. 
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much better favoured, yet have neglected to teach them, than on those who, whilst 
they are sinning, know not what they are doing.”78 
 
Speke’s observations recall the Biblical story that tells of Ham’s sin when he failed to care for 
his father, Noah, when intoxicated.79 Upon Noah’s awakening, he quite literally curses Ham for 
his failures then blesses his other two sons for their correction of their errant brother. “Cursed be 
[Ham’s lineage]! The lowest of the slaves shall he be to his brothers.”80 
 Understanding Speke’s description, its reference, and the fact that this was initial 
European exposure to central Africa helps to explain its reverberation within western European 
society. This was a well-known biblical passage used as an explanatory tool for a very unknown 
people, one to explain away with divine approval the physical and cultural differences between 
Europeans and Africans. This perception combined with a need to explain away the 
accomplishments of societies within Africa without acknowledging them as equivalent to 
European societies. Instead, Europeans perceived descendants of Ham (Hamites) as responsible 
for the ‘civilized’ accomplishments within Africa, but also that they were at risk of succumbing 
to the ‘uncivilized’ indigenous peoples. Thus, to Europeans, the Hamites were not only superior 
but needed support in further civilizing indigenous Africans.81 It was this cultural framework and 
stereotype of the Hamitic Hypothesis that Belgians and the White Fathers brought with them into 
Rwanda.  
                                                   
78 Speke, 11–12; Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1999). 
Speke is referencing Genesis, Chapter 9 where it details Noah’s interactions with his sons. See Hochchild’s work for 
a detailed description of the race to find ‘the heart of Africa,’ as well as the political maneuvering of this period. 
79 Michael D Coogan, The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocryphal, Deuterocanonical Books: 
With the Apocryphal, Deuterocanonical Books (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 22–23.See footnote 
annotating passage 9.18-27. This texts suggests the specific language possibly indicates sexual acts, but at the very 
least concur with the failure of duty to one’s father. 
80 The New American Bible, 10. Genesis 9:25 
81 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 79–87. 
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The second explanation of European views of Rwanda ethnic groups was via the Hamitic 
Hypothesis combined with existing elements of Rwandan society in the early 1900s.  The history 
of Hutu and Tutsi as ethnic categories is long and complex, and one in part that resulted in the 
term ‘Tutsi’ denoting persons deemed socially superior. Europeans then perceived that Tutsi 
were social elites, thus, the Europeans deduced, they must be Hamites and deserving of 
preferential treatment to assist them in civilizing other Rwandans.  This was the basis of social 
understanding that served as the foundation upon which Belgians and the White Fathers built 
their educational systems.  
In order to enforce the inflated social dichotomy between Hutu and Tutsi, Belgians 
instituted a requirement in the early 1930s that mandated members of each group carry 
identification cards. This policy soon led to the segregation of Hutu and Tutsi education.82 Even 
though the education system and the leaders of it changed in the early twentieth century, the 
common factor of preferential treatment of Tutsi over Hutu remained. Whether administrators 
favored Tutsi over Hutu to attend the schools or whether both ethnic groups attended but Tutsi 
received superior education, the hierarchy remained until after the Second World War.  
The White Father’s method of governance over the school exposes the hierarchical nature 
of society. The most telling manifestation of this preferential treatment, besides allowance for 
enrollment, lies in the choice of language instruction according to ethnic classification. The 
conditions in schools, including the school in Kagbayi, for example, appear very consistent with 
indigenous boarding (residential) schools in North America in the nineteenth and twentieth 
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centuries.83 School rules forbad any communication in a student’s native language (either 
Swahili or Kinyarwanda) and instead only allowed students to speak in French or Latin.  
Students had very limited contact with families over the course of studies that lasted around ten 
years.84 This process not only divided the population, but Belgians also took Tutsi graduates of 
higher levels of this education and replaced chiefs who were against the European presence with 
these recent graduates to decrease political friction.85 This process displays that Belgians, with 
the assistance of the White Fathers, manipulated the population to ease the political transition of 
colonial rule for Europeans’ own benefit.86 
For schools that accepted both Hutu and Tutsi there existed two curricula. The one for 
Tutsi included instruction in French, therefore empowering those students to take on roles as 
adults within Belgian colonial society.87 The curriculum for Hutu explicitly did not include 
teaching in or of French, only in Swahili. In these and other ways, the educational system 
perpetuated the subjugation of Rwandan culture to European culture and Hutu to Tutsi. Rwandan 
children and young adults received this reinforced narrative from the White Fathers.88  
As these examples show, the White Fathers power had significantly increased since their 
entry into Rwanda in 1900. Their presence – in missions, churches, and schools – not only 
extended across Rwanda’s geography and increased in number of buildings, but further increased 
                                                   
83 For a discussion of education as a tool of colonization and of empire and a comparative analysis on 
American and Canadian residential/boarding schools, see Andrew Woolford, This Benevolent Experiment: 
Indigenous Boarding Schools, Genocide, and Redress in Canada and the United States (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2015); James Axtell, Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of North America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
84 Linden and Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, 197–98. 
85 Linden and Linden, 156. 
86 For additional discussions of Belgian use of education as a tool of empire and propaganda, see Matthew 
G Stanard, Selling the Congo: A History of European Pro-Empire Propaganda and the Making of Belgian 
Imperialism. (Lincoln: University Of Nebraska Press, 2015), 43. 
87 Linden and Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, 184 n.222. 
88 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 89–90. 
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to alter cultural practices. The power to build schools or create curriculum is one thing, but the 
power to depose a monarch is quite another.  
Political Manipulation 
The second significant way that the White Fathers exerted and gained power in Rwanda 
was through political manipulation. This occurred significantly during the 1930s. The event that 
most represents this use of political manipulation to gain and show power is the overthrow of 
Rwanda’s mwami.89 With the ousting of Musinga, the Europeans removed a significant barrier to 
Catholic evangelization and thus, unfettered colonization of Rwanda. Before Musinga’s removal, 
Tutsi had been skeptical of conversion to Christianity. But following his removal, his son Mutara 
became king and political pressure lifted, enabling more conversions. A wave of Tutsi 
conversions culminated in an event that the White Fathers referred to as la tornade, the tornado 
of conversions from 1932-1936.90 Mutara himself converted to Christianity in 1943, twelve years 
after his assumption and his father’s deposition.91 This sequence of events, beginning with the 
White Father’s overthrow of Musinga, is significant because it displays the Catholic order’s rise 
in power and establishment as a political actor.  
The change in leadership occurred neither without resistance nor without aid. Instead, the 
increasing acceptance of Catholicism and its shaping of Rwandan culture resulted from the 
significant political manipulations of leaders in the White Fathers with the support of Belgian 
colonial leaders. Key to this was one of the most senior priests in Rwanda, the Vicar Apostolic of 
                                                   
89 Linden and Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, 195. Another more subtle form of political 
manipulation was the creation of the magazine Kinyamateka, effectively pro-Church propaganda. 
90 Linden and Linden, 190; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 41. An interesting cross-
cultural connection is that the White Fathers used a term of extreme weather to refer to the mass conversions and, in 
1959, the Rwandans used the Kinyarwandan word muyaga, meaning “a strong but variable wind” to refer to the 
social revolution or jacquerie in that year. 
91 Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide, 39–40. In an act that further symbolized the integration of the 
Europeans and Rwandans, Mutara had two Europeans at his side for his baptism: Classe, as his spiritual advisor, and 
Pierre Ryckmans, the Belgian governor of Ruanda-Urundi.  
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Rwanda, Léon-Paul Classe.  Classe worked with the colonial governor of Ruanda-Urundi to 
convince the Belgian Colonial Ministry to enable the deposition of Musinga.92 Specifically, 
Classe worked to convince one of Musinga’s sons, Mutara, that he should claim the position as 
king before and superior to his siblings.93 Mutara had received a European-taught education and 
Classe correctly assessed that this education and Mutara’s installation as king would make him a 
more sympathetic to European presence than his father had been. While the consideration to 
depose Musinga began in the mid-1920s, it began in earnest in late 1930 and gained final 
approval from Belgian authorities in late 1931 (it occurred in November 1931).94 Initial 
responses revealed that the Belgian and Fathers’ preference for Mutara was a success.  Kabgayi 
was the location of Mutara’s first official royal visit and, while there, leaders delivered speeches 
about the “divine dependence of kings,” a hardly subtle nod to the entanglement of the White 
Fathers with Belgian colonial rule and the Rwandan monarch.95 
There were two other actions within this larger event of the deposition that display the 
White Fathers’ manipulation of power dynamics for their own advantage. This usurpation was 
not the only act on Rwandan society that influenced the cultural narrative.  First, when the 
Belgian governor carried out the deposition, he forced Musinga to surrender the physical 
manifestation of his power, the Kalinga drums.96 The importance of the drums in Rwanda is 
analogous to the importance of a bejeweled crown of precious metal in western European 
kingdoms. A stolen crown equates to a coup d’état and likewise the loss of the drums symbolized 
                                                   
92 Linden and Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, 170–72; Des Forges, Defeat Is the Only Bad 
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Musinga’s loss of power.97 Second, the White Fathers restricted information and did not respect 
the inclusion of traditional royal court advisors to select the successor. Not only did they not 
inform the advisors, but they also chose Mutara’s name for him and only after this process then 
did they recall the advisors for the coronation ceremony.98  
The political Influence did not cease with the completion of Musinga’s deposition. 
Although debates between Rwandans and the Fathers in the 1940s revealed the beginnings of 
discontent that would more fully manifest in the 1950s, the Catholic church’s foothold in the 
region remained strong, even throughout the war.99 Following la tornade and the Second War 
World, the White Fathers held a Jubilee anniversary celebration for Mutara. The celebration of 
the Jubilee over three days in late June 1957 shows that the White Fathers and Belgian influence 
of installing Mutara, a monarch sympathetic to the colonial cause, had a long-term staying 
power.100 A review of the dates of his Jubilee – 1931 to 1957 – reveal an influence and resonance 
over an entire generation of Rwandans. A closer look at the Jubilee reveals political influences 
that shaped the Rwandan narrative.101 Highlighting two examples – religious leaders who 
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attended and Mutara’s choice to wear Western clothing – shows the presence of this consistent 
influence and the preferred narrative. 
The attendance of a representative of the Pope to the Jubilee is one example of continued 
political influence. The Jubilee took place in Nyanza (not the Kabgayi mission) and the events 
therein were predominately Rwandan cultural practices, including “all the country’s folklore.” 
Despite that cultural focus, however, the White Fathers noted that “the showpiece of the feast 
was no doubt the religious ceremony” (Catholic mass).102  Occurring simultaneously with the 
mwami’s Jubilee was the Jubilee of 50 years of Kabgayi mission and as part of this celebration a 
“delegate of the Sovereign Pontiff [the Pope]” had a “triumphant visit” in the Vicariate (religious 
province) for ten days.103 For a representative of the Pope to visit central Africa at a time when 
the mwami’s Jubilee was also occurring was almost certainly not a coincidence.104 Instead, his 
presence shows the political influence the White Fathers and the Catholic Church had even 
within an event categorized as traditionally Rwandan. 
The second example that further shows the influence and narrative that colonial powers 
reinforced to Rwandans is in regard to clothing. While the wearing of European-style clothing by 
the mwami was not new in 1950s (Mutara’s father, Musinga, wore a colonial uniform, e.g), the 
context of the wearing of a business suit during a Rwandan ceremony makes it a significant 
                                                   
102 A.G.M.Afr., “Événements,” 25 1956, Chroniques et Rapports Annuels, General Archives of the Society 
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political statement and reveals the cultural dance that Rwandan leaders participated in during 
colonial rule.  
In a photo from the colonial governor’s memoir, Mwami Mutara pours milk into a 
container that a group of children hold105. This likely held great significance for the children as 
well as adults. Cows held a privileged status in Rwandan society and its history, as some scholars 
tie the importance of cows in their use as capital as responsible for the founding the Nyiginya 
Dynasty, of which mwami Mutara was a descendent.106 While the children in the photo appear to 
be wearing a uniform, the adults throughout the photo wear various culturally normative and 
weather appropriate outfits: several Europeans wear short pants and short sleeves and several 
Africans wear wrapped and draped robes consistent with other photographs of traditional 
clothing. The king, however, wears a Western-style suit including loafer shoes and socks, 
possibly a necktie, and even including a watch (with a possibly leather band). The celebratory 
milking of the cows and sharing of the milk with Rwandan youth seems that it held great cultural 
significance in Rwanda…and yet, the king of Rwanda is not wearing culturally aligned clothing 
for the event. This, especially when considered in combination with Mutara’s baptism, could 
represent the acceptance of the endorsed European narrative as the acceptable Rwandan identity. 
The White Fathers and Belgian, in their combined efforts, succeeded in their political 
manipulation of Rwandan society, which worked in conjunction with the forces of education. 
Yet there was still a third arena where the White Fathers reached into Rwandan communities.  
Social Justice Work 
The previous two examples of evangelization, including education, and political 
manipulation show the narratives that the White Fathers, in conjunction with the Belgians, 
                                                   
105 Harroy, Rwanda, 206. 
106 Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom, 47. 
Rollinson 
 15 
supplied to Rwandans in the early and mid-twentieth century. However, their focus on altering 
Rwandan society does not mean that the White Fathers were static actors. Indeed, White Fathers 
in Rwanda after the Second World War were considerably different from their predecessors, and 
this reveals that the religious order was a dynamic actor.  Even though they underwent a 
generational change as a group, they still continued to provide a narrative of identity for 
Rwandans.  
The postwar environment was powerful and provided a catalyst for some of this change. 
Collectively, more individuals within the White Fathers held more liberal beliefs than their 
predecessors that were also more focused on social justice and, thus, more focused on aiding the 
Hutu, not only converting them to Christianity.107 With the end of the war came the fear of 
communism, and that fear also reached the White Fathers in Rwanda by way of the Catholic 
Church. Communism, in part feared for its connection to atheism, required a bulwark to stop its 
advance. To accomplish the guard against this and to provide social justice services to Hutu 
around Kabgayi, the White Fathers established an agricultural cooperative in late 1956 
(sanctioned by the governor of Ruanda-Urundi in February 1957).108 They hoped that by 
providing improved and stable conditions for workers would make the allure of Communism less 
attractive while also tempering the perceived excesses of capitalism.109 
 The White Fathers built the cooperative adjacent to the mission at Kabgayi and named it 
“Travail – Fidélité – Progrès” (“Work, Loyalty, Progress”), TRAFIPRO, for short.110 Consistent 
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with cooperative models in western Europe at the time and even in contemporary America, 
workers contributed a fee to join TRAFIPRO and then benefitted from the superstructure 
surrounding the group to assist with the process of agricultural business.111  In this case, the 
structure of TRAFIPRO aimed to provide a place for workers to receive loans, have a place to 
produce the crops as well as sell them, vehicles to transport goods, creation of roads to transport 
the vehicles, and the logistical and bureaucratic systems to support this business (among several 
other specific goals).112 As of late 1956, TRAFIPRO was just a plan for a shop in Kabgayi that 
would sell local products – sorghum, rice, soap, sugar, coffee – with the eventual goal that “once 
the cooperative TRAFIPRO is well launched and consolidated in the territory of Nyanza, it will 
extend over all of Rwanda.”113 By the records of the 1959 Annual Reports, the White Fathers 
appear to have done so. They reported having thirteen stores (magasins) with 5,487 members 
(coopérateurs), compared to the starting members of 457, a twelve-fold increase.114  
 TRAFIPRO, however, served as more than a store or a vehicle or a committee for the 
community. It also served as a means for self-organization and empowerment, especially for the 
Hutu counter-elite whom the White Fathers had educated and whom the priests were keen to 
keep within their control.115 The Hutu counter-elites, the évolués, were ready to be a part of the 
decolonization process for Rwanda and proceed into the future.116 These radical ideas were part 
                                                   
111 Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide, 78. 
112 A.G.M.Afr., “Coopérative.” 
113 A.G.M.Afr.; Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide, 78. Original text: “Une fois la cooperative 
“TRAFIPRO” bien lancée et consolidée dans le territoire de Nyanza, elle s’éntendra sur tour le Ruanda.” 
114 A.G.M.Afr., “Action sociale,” 7 1959, Chroniques et Rapports Annuels, General Archives of the Society 
of Missionaries of Africa; A.G.M.Afr., “Coopérative.” 
115 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 45; Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide, 45; 
Linden and Linden, Church and Revolution in Rwanda, 231 & 240. 
116 Stanard, Selling the Congo, 275n84. Stanard defines évolués as “a condescending and erroneously 
applied term used by Belgians and other Europeans to specify Africans who were ‘civilized’ and European educated 
– literally ‘evolved’.” Acknowledging the condescension of the term, this author has deemed the term historically 
necessary to specify the group of Hutu involved in this historical discussion and to be consistent in terminology with 
other scholarship. This paper, as do other sources, uses ‘counter-elite’ as a synonym.  
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of why White Fathers desired to keep them within their realm of control. As such, several of 
these men were in leadership positions, such as within TRAFIPRO or one of the several 
vernacular magazines that the White Fathers published. This leadership position, while under the 
watchful eyes of the priests’ supervision, also provided the évolués experience and taught them 
the skills they could, in the future, apply on their own.  
This chapter has argued that, since education provides some of the first narratives for 
individuals to view themselves and thus construct identities, the White Fathers held a vital role in 
process of identity formation for Rwandans in early to mid-twentieth century Rwanda, 
specifically in Kabgayi.117 Through evangelization, education, political manipulation, and social 
justice work, the White Fathers were political actors who successfully provided the context and 
cause for how Rwandans viewed themselves. The next two chapters will further discuss the 
évolués by first discussing their cultural competition and then how they fought against this 
competition. The group the évolués pushed back against was the mwami’s High Council of 
advisors – the Conseil Supérieur du Pays.  By first discussing the CSP and then their prominent 
political actions then enable analysis of the évolués response that launched their political 
dialogue on the international stage and began the initial stages of the process of genocide.  
                                                   
117 King, “The Rwandan Genocide: A Case Study.” 
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Chapter 2: The Conseil Supérieur du Pays in Nyanza, 1954-1957 
 
It would be difficult at the present stage to specify when it will be  
possible to grant us self-government, but we are anxious that we  
should be trained for self-government now.118 
Conseil Supérieur du Pays, February 1957 
 
This chapter discusses the Conseil Supérieur du Pays (the CSP). The CSP was a Tutsi-
majority council of chiefs who acted as advisors to the mwami, were vocal about local politics, 
and whose meetings were reasonably popular topics of debate among Rwandans.119 The CSP 
were the mwami’s council, his advisors, and accordingly he presided over the council.120 The 
Belgian colonial government created the council in 1954 to be both a council of advisors to the 
Rwandan mwami.121 The CSP were active politically and used their available power and agency 
to assert their role in Rwandan society. They viewed themselves as leaders in Rwanda, as evident 
by how they exercised their power, including in response to Belgian and United Nations political 
actions. Therefore, as this chapter argues, their prominent political document from February 
1957, “Mise au Point,” reveals not just their political stances but illuminates who they were as 
Rwandans.122 This document is noteworthy not only because it shows the voices of Rwandans at 
a time where European voices saturated Rwandan society (as the previous chapter argued), but 
also because this political argument echoed far beyond 1957. It is because the CSP sent in 
writing an argument to the United Nations that the Hutu évolués responded in writing back to the 
                                                   
118 United Nations Trusteeship Council, “Report on Ruanda-Urundi (T/1402),” 42. 
119 United Nations, “T/1201,” 40. 
120 United Nations, 35. 
121 Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide, 212. 
122 The impetus for the CSP’s discussion of these ideas was from sermons of a Tutsi priest, Father Louis 
Gasore. Sources discuss how he confronted problems in Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda) through lens of ethnicity, race, 
legal, and economic, topics that “Mise au Point” specifically examine. For further information, see the following: 
J.J. Carney, “Beyond Tribalism: The Hutu-Tutsi Question and Catholic Rhetoric in Colonial Rwanda” 42, no. 2012 
(2018): 184–86; 192; Jean-Paul Harroy, Rwanda: Souvenirs d’un compagnon de la marche du Rwanda vers la 
democratie et l’independence (Paris: Academie des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, 1984), 237 & 257; Donat Murego, La 




Belgian colonial governor. With this debate as prologue, the triennial visit from the UN 
trusteeship council – effectively an inspection of Belgian colonial rule – took place in September 
1957. The debate the CSP and évolués initiated did not end with this visit, however, but instead 
Rwandan leaders from the CSP and évolués only just began grappling with the arguments one 
year after they started, in March 1948. The discussions in this chapter, therefore, are the first 
shots fired, the taking of sides for the acceptance and hardening of the ethnic binary that 
Rwandans ultimately accepted, as Mamdani argues in When Victims Become Killers.123 With the 
battle lines drawn, the classification of ‘the other’ complete and the beginning of symbolization 
and discrimination, the roots of the process of genocide in Rwanda are in this political 
dialogue.124  
 While the White Fathers were preaching Catholicism across Rwanda and increasing their 
political power, the Rwandan indigenous government continued to hold its presence in Nyanza. 
The anniversary celebration for mwami Mutara took place there in late June through early July 
1957. While this event was fraught with power dynamics and political tensions, Rwandans were 
also capable of staking a dominant role in the conversations of power and politics. That is 
precisely what happened a few months prior to the Jubilee, in February. The United Nations 
Trusteeship Council had previously announced a planned visit for its Visiting Mission in late 
September with the intent to inspect the status of Ruanda-Urundi and Belgium’s governance. 
This was a routine occurrence, the previous one having occurred the year of the CSP’s creation, 
1954. The CSP, in a bid to influence the agenda and conversation for the visit in six-month’s 
time, published “Mise au Point,” their Statement of Views. This document, and the response 
(discussed in chapter 3) successfully engaged the attention of the UN. While chapter 4 will 
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analyze the UN’s own reactions to these publications, it is first necessary to contextualize their 
dialogue to consider the CSP to define who they were and understand what they said.  Analyzing 
the CSP includes considering their origins, power capacity, and identity as expressed in “Mise au 
Point.”   
While only Rwandans served on the CSP, it was not a Rwandan-established organization. 
Instead, it was a product of Belgian colonial governance. In July 1952, Belgians announced a 
plan for Independence in Ruanda-Urundi within a decade. In the following years, other elements 
of this plan became clear – there was a general call for democratic institutions within Rwanda 
(1953) and elections for the geo-political regions called sub-chiefdoms (sous-chefferies) 
(1956).125 While these processes did reinforce nepotism (since progression through an election 
required a candidate to have begun at the bottom of the process until they eventually became part 
of a senior council), the new processes and institutions were nevertheless a transition from an 
oligarchy to democracy.126  
The CSP was not exempt from this nepotistic process of election. Only men who had first 
been chiefs of smaller areas could have eventually worked their way up to the CSP. The literal 
translation of French name Conseil Supérieur du Pays translates to ‘Superior Council of the 
Country’ (although most scholarship uses the acronym CSP, as this paper also does).  Regardless 
of the language of the title, the superlative corresponded to the council’s job and its relationship 
to the mwami: they were his advisors for the country. Sources available do not seem to indicate 
the exact limits of their duties and responsibilities, but what does seem clear is that they were not 
a puppet council.127 It seems that the mwami valued them for their trust and abilities, and it also 
                                                   
125 Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide, 46–47. 
126 Carney, 78. 
127 The Belgian organizational chart of the Administration of Ruanda-Urundi from 1954 does not display 
CSP, instead only listing the Administration, Mwami, chiefs, and sub-chief. United Nations, “T/1201,” 29. 
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seems that the United Nations also trusted them to a limited degree. While the Europeans 
certainly did not seem to view them as equals, they did incorporate their observations in the 
Report of the Visiting Mission of 1957 and valued the CSP as superior to the évolués. Doing so 
required the UN, at the very least, to validate, thus empower, the CSP on the international stage.  
People on the Council 
While the process for an individual becoming part of the CSP was simultaneously 
nepotistic and democratic, another factor that influenced a man’s presence at all at this time was 
if they had managed to stay in power without suffering a Belgian-influenced replacement who 
would be more sympathetic to the colonial cause, which as the White Fathers did with the 
mwami.   
While it is not clear whether or whom the Belgians might have rotated out, there is a clear 
connection of the CSP to the White Fathers, and thus European influence, if not approval, via 
their educational authority. The White Fathers took over the educational system in Ruanda-
Urundi in 1930 and the Belgians founded the CSP in the early 1950s.128 That, in combination 
with the fact that the education (especially for those in seminary, even if they did not become 
priests) lasted for close to a decade, shows that the members of the CSP had received a heavy 
dose of religious colonialism. There were at least three members of the CSP in the late 1950s 
who were graduates of the White Fathers’ school in Astrida – Michael Kayibura, Pierre 
Mungalurire, and Michel Rwagasana.129 Beyond the educational importance there is also an 
added layer of class to this commonality. Attendance and graduation from Astrida became a 
                                                   
128 United Nations Trusteeship Council, “Report on Ruanda-Urundi (T/1402),” 43. Carney, Rwanda Before 
the Genocide, 212. In “Mise au Point,” the CSP refer to a time presumably immediately before writing the document 
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129 Fidèle Nkundabagenzi, Rwanda Politique: 1958-1960 (Bruxelles: Centre de Recherche et d’Information 
Socio-Politiques (CRISP), 1962), 408, 410, 412. 
Rollinson 
 22 
status symbol (something contemporary readers might draw akin to being an alumni of an Ivy 
League school in the United States, for example). It was not only the presumed education – 
which included Western linguistic abilities – that students received, but the networking and 
power as well that made this a formative experience and provided them prestigious status.  
While powerful people with influential background and deeply rooted connections 
throughout Rwandan society were on the council, it is not as clear how much power the CSP 
itself possessed within the full range of the government, whether Rwandan indigenous, Belgian 
colonial, or both. It is clear from the United Nations’ response to “Mise au Point” that this 
response assisted in legitimizing the CSP. This is especially apparent when compared to how the 
United Nations referenced the évolués that the UN valued the CSP more than their political 
opponent. Briefly considering the United Nations’ response to the CSP raises the question of 
what the CSP said, what they meant, and what it says about themselves. To accomplish this 
requires a close look at “Mise au Point.”  
 
Exceptionalism  
Prior to analyzing this work, it is important to acknowledge the exceptionalism of this 
source. “Mise au Point” is not representative of the whole of every other Tutsi’s perspectives.  
The CSP are elite men, highly educated, and self-selecting. They took public political stances to 
engage in this debate. They did not write this work in Kinyarwandan, but French, the language of 
Belgium and the UN. Tutsi mostly comprised the CSP, but most Tutsi in Ruanda-Urundi did not 
work for the mwami or were even a tribal chief. The members of the CSP thus are exceptional in 
that they are elites even compared to the privileged legal status of their fellow Tutsi in Rwanda.  
Despite these drawbacks, this source is still valuable for scholarly discussion. Even 
though the group and its writing are exceptional and do not fully represent who they claim to, 
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they are available written sources by Rwandans. Therefore, “Mise au Point” provides a suitable 
aid as a dialogue-based snapshot in time to understand Rwandan government in 1957.  
 
“Mise au Point”  
The CSP published “Mise au Point” in February, four months prior to the United Nations 
Visiting Mission’s official visit to Ruanda-Urundi. They had the intent to influence or 
manipulate political conversation. This was consistent with previous actions for other Mission 
visits. For example, in the last decade, the mwami had abolished the practices of uburetwa (in 
1949) and ubuhake (in 1954) just prior to previous Mission visits.130 While these two previous 
actions related to Hutu and Tutsi relations, the social and political climate since then became 
more volatile. ‘The Hutu-Tutsi question,’ as people called the tension of the relations between 
Hutu and Tutsi, rose to the forefront of many communications throughout the 1950s. 
Additionally, it was five years into Belgium’s ten-year plan for Independence. These combined 
conditions provided a different environment than before while still existing within the same 
context of political power plays by Rwandans.  
Some Rwandans had already seen an increase of power due to the implementation of 
universal male suffrage in 1956 and council elections.131 TRAFIPRO, the farming cooperative, 
was in its first year of operation and was slowly growing in both size and influence. Belgian 
colonial leaders were content with these advances, but the CSP sought a more active role in these 
moves. Thus, they initiated the conversation for the 1957 UN visit.  
                                                   
130 These were systems of clientship, or an economic and power negotiation between a client (akin to a 
buyer) and the patron (akin to the seller). Both parties might benefit from these deals, the client having access to 
resources and protection, and the patron having access to labor. Over time, these systems came to mirror the Hutu-
Tutsi divide and increasingly unpopular as a way to control labor. These systems were not existent from time 
immemorial, but, as Vansina argues, within certifiable history. Vansina traces uburetwa to the early 1870s under 
Rwabugiri’s rule and ubuhake to Ndori’s rule. Ndori founded the kingdom c.1650.  Therefore, while uburetwa was 
fairly new, ubuhake was intrinsically part of Rwandan culture. Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The 
Nyiginya Kingdom, 47, 134, 216. 
131 Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression, 185–88. 
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“Mise au Point” demands that Rwanda strive for independence, but concedes that this 
must occur with deliberate training and steady action, implying that this balance is what would 
be necessary for a smooth transfer of power.132 In support of that continued development and 
progression toward self-governance, the CSP focused on four main ideas. These were problems 
they deemed needed training to correct on the road to Independence. These four themes were: 
education, “participation in government,” “economic and social policy,” and the “reduction of 
colour prejudices.”133 These themes have an additional layer of interconnectedness beyond their 
content. The CSP also crafted their writing in such a way that reveals how they self-identified, 
identified others, and responded to them. “Mise au Point” displays specific choices of 
vocabulary, highlights specific frame of reference, and includes key allusions.  By discussing the 
content and analyzing these later elements in the content all while assigning the CSP agency in 
their writing, then the elements of their identity come into focus.  
The first and vividly apparent element that the CSP use in “Mise au Point” is vocabulary. 
When the CSP discuss education, policy, and involvement in government, their word choice 
stands out. In the discussion on education, what they describe as “the key [to solve] all other 
problems,” the CSP’s vocabulary signals their sense of identity as members of the collective 
group of Rwandans.134 In this section, the CSP calls for Rwandan students to receive the same 
education as Belgian students, including legal certifications and technical training, and for the 
languages prioritized in education to be Kinyarwandan (“greater stress should be placed on the 
teaching of our national language”), followed by a secondary option of  English and tertiary of 
                                                   
132 United Nations Trusteeship Council, “Report on Ruanda-Urundi (T/1402),” 42. The reading of the 
CSP’s thesis is congruent with J.J. Carney and Catharine Newbury’s assessment of “Mise au Point.” 
133 United Nations Trusteeship Council, 42. 
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Flemish.135 In this section, there is a notable use of both we/us and identification of Rwanda as a 
whole entity. In addition to the previous quote, the CSP states that “the Banyaruanda have no 
access to university education in Ruanda,” and they urge that “we share a common concern.”136 
A third example of this is when they express assurance that with sufficient assistance from other 
groups and “the Banyaruanda [it] will soon enable us to achieve the desired goal.”137 This 
tension between inclusion of the group (through use of the Banyaruanda) and implied exclusion 
through self-definition (use of our and we) seems to reflect the CSP’s advisory role, balancing 
existence in the group with corporate identification in a senior role.   
In the discussion on policy, the CSP’s vocabulary also shows aspects of their identity. In 
this section, the discussion of policy is broad and diverse, ranging from economic and political, 
to cultural and social. While the CSP had previously focused most of its ideas regarding race and 
education externally, their discussion of policies consists of both external and internal 
reflections.  In this conversation of policy, the CSP calls for external assistance in the form of 
foreign aid to assist them with their internal improvements. They suggest various sources of aid, 
from “Belgium and, if need be, international organizations of Europe and America.”138 They 
continue, saying that “[t]he people under colonial rule should not be held responsible for that 
situation; for while in some cases they were wrong not to respect the rights of the settlers, in 
others, both sides were to blame. The economic domination of the settlers, giving them a 
monopoly on action, is often the cause of the conflict.”139 What is most fascinating is the CSP’s 
                                                   
135 United Nations Trusteeship Council, 42–43. When referencing the educational equivalence, the CSP is 
directly referencing the Astrida secondary school. Also, the addition of Flemish is a nod to the split within Belgium 
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136 United Nations Trusteeship Council, 43. Emphasis added 
137 United Nations Trusteeship Council, 43.Emphasis added.  
138 United Nations Trusteeship Council, 44. 
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use of “the settlers” in this sentence. Applying Mamdani’s research to this vocabulary informs 
one reading of this excerpt. It seems, applying this research, that is not that the CSP is referring 
to the colonial government of Belgium as settlers in Rwanda, but instead that they are invoking 
the Hamitic Hypothesis.140 Another reading of this excerpt could be referencing the Belgian 
settler-colonists in the Congo who were asserting their rights to African land for at least the last 
few years.141Thus, despite their previous inclusive rhetoric of we and our, the CSP retreats into 
more divisive language in use of “indigenous” and “settler” to describe, possibly to describe their 
fellow Rwandans. This further shows that the CSP simultaneously views itself as citizens of 
Rwanda (through their use of first-person plural pronouns) but they also view themselves as an 
omnipotent entity that can impose categories on other Rwandans. 
The CSP’s discussion of their external policy views, aimed to appeal to Belgian power, 
also engages with internal actions, aimed to improve Rwanda’s geo-political and economic 
status. In this discussion, the CSP openly call for steps to independence, although they deem it 
necessary through a slow and steady process of internal improvements to support the external 
political transition. In the section entitled, “the Government of our country” the CSP discusses 
the theme of governance. They discuss the increased democratic structure but warn of the need 
for cooperation both within present context and in future transitions.142 They argue that an 
                                                   
140 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 32. Mamdani discusses how, as an extension of the Hamitic 
Hypothesis, the Hutu were seen as the long-term indigenous people and the Tutsi seen as the “settlers”, as discussed 
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141 Chapter Four will further discuss this group, the Central African Congress, as part of a larger element of 
international responses. Paul Claussen et al., eds., “The Consul General at Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Department 
of State,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1 
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“indirect administration requires two parties, two parties which will co-operate. [...] There can be 
co-operation only if the indigenous Government of the state is effective, well-organized and 
entrusted with real responsibilities.”143 This external plea for transition by stages is both 
inclusive to all Rwandans and displays that the CSP sees itself as being part of a group, just as 
they discussed with education. Their identity of self is very apparent through their language, 
especially their use of we/us/our, as well as its references to their fellow Kinyarwandans as the 
“indigenous” population. 
 The CSP expend effort to balance perspectives and convince the UN of their needs, but 
they are not always so measured. After detailing the need for international aid, they continue, not 
calmly or meekly, but instead aggressively. Having asked for aid, they continue explaining that 
Rwanda needs industrialization, “But in order to industrialize, we must invest and to invest we 
must have capital. […] It is practically impossible for us to obtain locally the capital needed for 
investment except out of income which is already insufficient; we would have to accept fresh 
sacrifices in order to achieve that objective, and they would be so painful that they could be 
imposed successfully only by a dictatorial and totalitarian government.”144 Here the CSP is not 
subtle. They are informing the UN that if they do not give them what they request, they will take 
it by other means that the UN and Western powers will find distasteful. Their use of “fresh 
sacrifices” and evoking extreme forms of government is sharp vocabulary that is intentionally a 
power play to get the UN’s attention.   
 Whether it is through use of pronouns that indicate inclusivity, their inclusion of 
Banyarwandan cultural identity, use of the binary settlers and indigenous, or aggressive word 
choice, the CSP’s vocabulary in “Mise au Point” displays their sense of self as in but not of the 
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Rwandan people and as being a powerful entity with persuasive agency. Further analysis of 
narrative tools will add more elements of the CSP’s perception of identity.  
The second tool within “Mise au Point” that explains the CSP’s identity is frame of 
reference. The CSP uses both an externally and internally oriented frame of reference to suit their 
argumentative needs, but ultimately emphasizes the external (i.e. international) relative to 
Rwanda as reflective of their self-perception as a senior government agency. While the CSP 
exerted their own agency in the act of writing this document, it is not known the intentionality 
behind the frames of reference used.  However, whether intentionally included for political 
purposes or to genuinely express themselves, analyzing the selections can still provide an 
understanding of how the CSP viewed their world and, thus, themselves. Regardless of their 
intention behind the inclusion, the choice itself reflects identity.  
Exposure of the tension between internal and external frames of reference exist 
throughout most of “Mise au Point.” The first themes that the CSP discuss are education and 
policies, likely for argumentative purposes, as these sections aim to politically manipulate the 
UN in preparation for their visit. These larger influential forces were likely of more immediate 
interest to the UN, or at the least, reveal the CSP’s perspective that they held this importance. 
Still included, but with less emphasis, the CSP includes racial and ethnic relations.  
In the section on education, the CSP use an external frame of reference to justify their 
perspective. They apply an emotional appeal as they aim to achieve these educational 
improvements. By leveraging the fact that they are under Belgian colonial rule, they “justify” 
their requirements by asserting the need to put Rwandan education in sync with “Western 
culture” that “is much more than science and knowledge. It is an education, way of life, a pattern 
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of behavior, a sense of the common good and of respect for the human person.”145 This clearly 
aims to appeal to the Western patriarchal system that seeks to guide Rwanda into civilization. 
There is an implied question here from the CSP. They seem to be challenging Western powers 
using their own logic against them. If they have deemed Rwanda uncivilized, then how can 
Rwanda become civilized without education to be the catalyst of this process? With this rhetoric, 
both literal and implied, the CSP reveals that they both exist and perceive themselves to be on 
the border between advisors and decisionmakers. On one hand, their language reveals that they 
see themselves as part of the national community. They are part of the people who use the 
Kinyarwandan language and need not adopt a northern European tongue. (That being said, they 
have already adopted a western European tongue since they wrote this statement in French.) 
Nevertheless, they are a colony and hence still fall under Western imperialism. Therefore, they 
argue that if this is the goal of the governmental rule, then Rwanda should be able to 
educationally benefit from this process. On the other hand, it seems that, while they see 
themselves as Rwandan, they are also aware of their status of power and do not see themselves 
as of the people, but instead maintain distance from the revolting évolués as they write with and 
emanate a professional and neutral tone.  
In the section on policy, the CSP again uses first an internal frame of reference followed 
by an external to persuade the UN of their argument. They discuss the required improvements 
internal to Rwanda saying, “the only way for the country to advance towards emancipation is by 
transitional stages; only thus can we avoid the difficulties which would be inevitable if we were 
to pass suddenly from trusteeship to freedom.”146 They fear that Rwanda is on “the brink of 
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disaster” due to limited natural resources and lack of industrialization.147 Thus, to improve these 
issues and support independence, the CSP calls for “the development of land through irrigation 
and other techniques [to make it] possible to increase crop yields. Better food for the labour force 
improves its physical capacity and its work output. Moreover, schools have to be opened to 
enable workers to acquire the training called for by modern production methods.”148 By better 
preparing Rwandan peoples, working conditions, and education, then the country will be more 
stable, thus be able to handle a transition of power, and finally be able to become autonomous 
from European political power, the overall goal of the UN Visiting Mission’s inspections and 
Belgium’s ten-year development plan. Here, as in the educational section, the CSP views itself as 
an advisory authority, at once being leaders of Rwanda but simultaneously also of its people.  
The CSP continue to use these internal and external frames of reference as “Mise au 
Point” continues. The inclusion and discussion of the goal of “reducing colour prejudice” is no 
exception.149 In this excerpt, the CSP highlights the “fundamental problem in [Rwanda that] is 
undoubtedly that of human relations between whites and non-whites.”150 Echoing their previous 
discussions of economics and society, here the CSP comments on discrimination. Their language 
is direct as they describe African capability as equal to European work: “[...] it is only right that 
justice should be done and that they should be paid according to their output and not according to 
the colour of their skin.”151 It is not only Europeans as compared to Africans in this section, 
though. It also is clear the CSP is commenting on internal Rwandan relations, both between Hutu 
and Tutsi and between men and women. 
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In the CSP’s continued discussion on race and ethnic relations, the section reveals that 
they worried deeply about these social relations and the role that they might play in the future of 
Rwanda. The fact that the CSP speaks in a more limited capacity about internal race relations but 
focuses more on external relations – the “human relations between whites and non-whites” – is 
not surprising.152  Not only was the CSP nearly completely Tutsi, the Nyingya Dynasty was also 
Tutsi and had ruled Rwanda for over 300 years.153  In the power dynamics of the CSP versus 
évolués, the CSP are clearly in the dominant position of the social power dynamic. Even if 
individuals recognized inequality, there would not be group motivation to impact change in the 
balance of power. Additionally, Ruanda-Urundi had an incredibly diverse population of over 4 
million included Europeans from 30 different countries and peoples from across East Africa, the 
Middle East, and India, as well as followers of several sects of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and 
native African regional spirituality.154 Thus, it seems the CSP are not interested in equalizing the 
balance of power within Rwanda (potentially decreasing their own position of power), but 
instead to increase their position relative to Europeans. Likewise, this applies to and illuminates 
their concern with education and production, even to the point of asking for international aid. 
Throughout each of the themes, it is clear that the CSP ultimately chooses to focus on issues with 
an externally focused frame of reference.  This bolsters the perception understood from their 
choice of vocabulary, further proving that they see themselves as a powerful entity and on with 
international influence.  
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The last tool that the CSP utilize in “Mise au Point” are allusions as an explanatory tool 
to further convince the UN of their argument. Several references woven into the discussions on 
government and policy particularly stand out for analysis. In their discussion of governmental 
participation, the CSP allude to parental relationship when arguing for greater participation and 
ultimate leadership of an independent Rwanda.155 They state that while the “present élite,” 
presumably themselves, “is not yet able to guide its political affairs alone” as they do not yet 
have “sufficient […] skill[s],” the CSP also pleads that “little children must learn to walk on their 
own feet.”156 Unlike an earlier reference to adolescence, here the CSP do not provide a 
Kinyarwandan equivalent or a translation.157 They do not qualify the expression with a cultural 
meaning or reference. The words stand on their own without quotation marks as the CSP’s own 
voice. Therefore, it is possible that this reference to “little children,” while it still could be a 
cultural reference, might instead be an appeal to Western powers and the overriding paternalistic 
tone of colonial rule. In addition to paralleling earlier references to Western paternalism in the 
discussion of education as a way of life, this could also mirror the preferred language of Roman 
Catholic teachings.  In these teachings, of which the members of the CSP would be well steeped 
in understanding and using, Christian leaders emphasize and followers self-identify as “children 
of [God]” to align with Biblical traditions.158 With this dual appeal of the paternalism of religion 
and government, this reference to “little children” seems to be a deliberate move by the CSP.  It 
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seems that could not only to appeal to Western powers but also could to convince them to allow 
or facilitate the CSP’s desired outcomes.   
Similar to their first reference in their discussion of domestic development, the CSP 
reference international aid. While already discussed earlier in this chapter, the incorporation of 
this potential resource is an important inclusion. In requesting foreign aid, the CSP is balancing 
their projected expertise on Rwanda with supplication to Western powers (or at the least 
perceived humility to them).  This balance is most apparent when they suggest that they will 
“leave to more competent people the task of finding an adequate solution.”159 These are the 
words of people who view themselves as advisors, asserting ideas confidently, but also add the 
caveat of advice, not policy, to their statement.  Reference to international aid is also a reference 
to the fact that they see themselves as in a position of power sufficient to activate this resource. 
Request for aid implies weakness relative to another’s position of power, but also indicates that 
the request, the CSP, perceives that they possess the ability to meaningfully execute the request. 
This, therefore, conveys a relative position of power coexisting with the relative fragility.  
This tone of advice echoes through the continued argument for foreign aid that includes a 
third allusion. In this excerpt, the CSP seems to want to head off any debates about domestic 
events by admitting to the “unfortunate results of recent political instability.”160 However, they 
are not specific as to the recent events in question. Perhaps it was the founding of the early 
political parties in 1955, or TRAFIPRO’s expansion or increased debate on ‘The Hutu-Tutsi 
question’ in 1956 that left them feeling unsettled? Either way, this and the following rhetoric is 
quite revealing. They continue, saying that “[t]he people under colonial rule should not be held 
responsible for that situation […] The economic domination of the settlers […] is often the cause 
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of the conflict.”161 While one reading of this excerpt is along the aforementioned analysis of 
Mamdani’s settler analysis, the context of the paragraph also opens up the comparison to 
European-Rwandan relations. Regardless though, the event that the CSP hints at (but does not 
name) is meaningful here. They both refuse to give the unnamed event power and show it has 
power over them. When they refuse to acknowledge it and give the event a name, they refuse to 
provide it more visibility. However, in that very same act, they also reveal that it has some power 
over them. If the event was harmless or meaningless, then naming it would not further a cause or 
provide acknowledgement impactful to the CSP. In the discussion of this last tool allusion, they 
reference “little children,” politically unmentionable events, and foreign aid. These references 
provide moments within “Mise au Point” for the CSP to establish a buoyancy for their power. 
These show some vulnerabilities, but more strongly they show the CSP’s ability and willingness 
to exert their power.  
The CSP’s agency and identity display through analysis of “Mise au Point” and the lens 
of the tools of vocabulary, frame of reference, and allusion. The CSP recognize that they do not 
possess the same kind of power as Western actors, but with the power they have they wield it 
fiercely. They diplomatically demand independence from colonial rule with a specific plan to do 
it, while simultaneously threatening the West with a rouge dictatorship if Western leaders do not 
meet their requests. They portray themselves as both Rwandans through their use of first-person 
plural pronouns (we/us/our) that declare group ownership of elements of Rwandan culture and 
identity (such as their shared language), but also express their distance from the Rwandan 
populace at times by declaring, either implicitly or explicitly, their seniority. Their use of 
multiple frames of reference that ultimately maintain an external focus are a mark of their 
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education and their desire and achievement of an increased presence on the international political 
stage. The CSP are, after all, the king’s superior council. Finally, through several allusions, their 
hints at power manipulation reveal that the CSP is not a weak entity. Their colonial guardian and 
argumentative opponent for this upcoming UN visit were their educators in their youth. The CSP 
may not be as strong as an international organization, but they understand their position of power 
relative to their opponent and they understand their opponent. From this understanding of 
themselves, they derive their power.  
Discussion of “Mise au Point” included considering its content and analyzing the 
narrative tools in the content. Doing so clearly demonstrates that the Conseil Supérieur du Pays 
were not passive actors, but instead had agency in what they wrote and what they expressed in 
that writing. Therefore, the content and analysis of “Mise au Point” expresses elements of their 
perception of themselves. Their writing shows they viewed themselves as Rwandans, but as 
superior to common folk.  They were not naïve or idealists, but realists even to the point of 
threatening Western powers with tyranny in Rwanda to achieve their declared goals. To that 
effect, they also clearly viewed themselves as actors on the international stage, actors who could 
invoke foreign aid or push back against external powers claiming Flemish had a place in their 
educational systems before their own native tongue. However, some of these qualities and 
assertions, especially their main focus on external power dynamics, were precisely what would 




Chapter 3:  The Hutu évolués in Kabgayi – 1930 – 1958 
 
While we agree that the current [T]utsi administration should participate more 
[…] we feel that a warning should be issued against a method, 
which tending to eliminate white-black colonialism, 
would leave a worse [Tutsi] colonialism over the [H]utu. 
 
Manifesto of the Bahutu, March 1957162 
   
This chapter discusses the Hutu évolués who acted in response to the CSP’s political 
dialogue.  The actions of the CSP and then the évolués in response are the beginning of the 
hardening into ethnic delineations of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. These transitioned from cultural 
distinctions, what Alison Des Forges refers to as “significant units of identification,” to ethnic 
groups.163 Analysis of the CSP’s “Mise au Point” and the évolués’ “Manifesto of the Bahutu” 
expands upon Mahmood Mamdani’s argument that “the Revolution [of 1959] not only left 
standing, but reinforced, the political identities created by colonialism.”164 This chapter contends 
that this hardening of identities was not just in 1959, but also occurred in 1957, as this analysis of 
“the Manifesto of the Hutu” proves.  
 Despite their introduction this late in the story, the Hutu have been part of Rwandan 
history for centuries, especially coming to the fore with the White Fathers establishment in 
Ruanda-Urundi. In the varied ways available to them, they had been acting as agents of change 
within communities since the early twentieth century. Popular narratives tend to treat Hutu in the 
extreme, including the ‘ancient tribal hatred.’165 They did not suddenly appear after the Second 
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World War ready to interact within a system that they knew nothing about. The Hutu, for 
instance, were the group who enabled the White Fathers to establish their missions. While 
mwami Musinga gave permission for their evangelizing, it was access to the Hutu – and only to 
the Hutu- that he permitted. Thus, the Hutu have been key actors despite their concurrent social 
subjugation. The Hutu have been a constant actor in tandem with the White Fathers as recipients 
of their education, patronage, protection, and cultural influence.  However, as the history from 
post-Second World War through the late 1950s demonstrates, the Hutu elite shifted from existing 
as tandem with the White Fathers to being peers to them.  The Hutu elite gained political training 
and agency with their action in TRAFIPRO, and thus honed their skills for their entrance onto 
the international stage. They became significant political actors with their publication in March 
1957 in response to the CSP’s “Mise au Point” in February as both groups pushed Rwanda down 
the road to independence.166 Before seeing how the évolués responded to the CSP, it is first 
necessary to retell the White Fathers history to explain how Hutu transitioned, in the eyes of 
Europeans, to évolués. This review also accounts for the transitions within the White Fathers that 
shifted social preferential treatment to the Hutu and thus provided the springboard for the 
évolués’ political launch in 1957.  
Following the end of the Second World War, the White Fathers experienced a 
generational shift, and these new priests who went to Rwanda were more democratic than 
hierarchical, were anticommunist, and aimed to assist the decolonization process.167 These men 
were from Belgium and Switzerland, less so from France, which contributed to the 
compositional shift.  Being from these countries, they likely had formative experiences during or 
following the First and Second World Wars that resulted in a shift in attitude regarding treatment 
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of Hutu. Belgian priests who had directly experienced German Occupation in the early 1940s 
might have especially carried memories of violent, forced subordination. The Belgian post-war 
environment, as Martin Conway articulates, was consistently shifting along a spectrum of 
various political, linguistic, and regional identities and these shifts occurred due to a popular 
outcry to update political coalitions.168 While this defined Belgium, other parts of Western 
Europe, many having already experienced the transformative wave of nationalism before the 
wars, focused on internal rebuilding of infrastructures, economies, and peoples while also 
working to establish a new regional power dynamic, as Tony Judt describes.169 Living and 
working in the post-war era, the priests brought these experiences with them to Rwanda.170 But it 
was not only their lived experiences, it was also their observation of what was occurring around 
the global in the post-war environment – the start of the Cold War, the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China, combat in Korea, and France’s involvement in French Indochina.171 
These experiences, while heterogenous and depending on the origins of each priest, influenced 
how they operated within Rwanda in the post-war environment where ideas of decolonization 
slowly seeped into the country, at least as early as 1953.172  
Additionally, outside of these internal or external social experiences, the perspectives of 
the Catholic church were also changing as it, was trying to figure out how to be modern.173 
According to James Chappel, since the 1930s, for most or all of the lives of this new generation 
of White Fathers, the Catholic church had aimed to stake their place in the world by defining 
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what modernism meant for Catholics. Primarily, from the 1930s into the 1950s, this new 
modernism meant anti-communism and “forg[ing] new alliances [to] survive.”174 With this hard 
line drawn, Catholics saw themselves as responsible for providing the antidote to the illness of 
communism.175  
This all contextualizes how, when this new generation of White Fathers came to Rwanda 
post-war, they began to upturn the previous preferential treatment solely given to the Tutsi. The 
priests began, instead, to sympathize with the Hutu and aim for ways to increase conditions for 
work in order to avoid the allegedly desirous elements of communism that sought to address 
worker’s needs.176 Additionally, the White Fathers aided Hutu when they created TRAFIPRO in 
late 1956.177 But how did the Hutu get to the point where they could receive this amount of 
attention from the White Fathers?  
When this new generation of White Fathers began to work in Rwanda, they saw the 
paternalistic ways that their predecessors had treated the évolués and they realized this (in 
combination with other poor decisions of the Catholic church), had delegitimized them, 
according to J.J. Carney. Instead of the évolués seeing the priests as patrons, as the Hutu 
originally had seen them as a buffer from the Tutsi, the White Fathers realized the évolués saw 
them as patronizing.178 According to Donat Murego, however, even though only Tutsi received 
the benefit of education (at least until more opportunities opened for Hutu in 1955), the Hutu 
experienced inclusion from the White Fathers, albeit for ulterior motives, but inclusion 
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nonetheless.179 Between the time of the White Fathers’ takeover of the educational system in 
1930 and Hutu educational inclusion in 1955, the only place Hutu could be educated were in the 
seminaries. The Hutu were again under the watchful eye of the White Fathers.180 Even with the 
constant oversight, when Hutu completed seminary education, they increased their social 
standing. Not only did the classroom provide knowledge and skills, but new opportunities also 
enabled Hutu to shed their second-class citizenry and gain power in Rwanda. It seems here that 
indeed the master’s tools – education as a ‘civilizing’ force – did succeed in dismantling the 
master’s house – the Church-supported Tutsi grip on power in Rwanda.181 
Disassembly of this metaphorical master’s house occurred slowly at first, but definitively. A 
revolt at the Great Seminary of Nyakibanda in 1950 wherein Hutu refused to follow the strict 
rules proved this correct.182 This revolt displayed to the priests that they would have to ramp up 
their focus on social justice, as well as focus on anti-communist measures, to maintain social 
decorum.183 The most prominent way they aimed to do this was through the creation of 
TRAFIPRO, which, along with several Catholic sponsored magazine and newspaper publications 
in the region, acted as a springboard for the Hutu évolués to enter the international stage.  
 Gregoire Kayibanda was one of the products of this educational system and he used it as 
the social springboard it was. He was a Hutu man born in eastern Rwanda on May 1st, 1924. 
Thus, his entire educational life, he lived under the tutelage of the White Fathers. This 
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integration into education almost certainly resulted in his fluency in English, French, and 
German, as well as his native Kinyarwandan.184 Part of his education took place at the 
Nyakibanda seminary, the very same one that revolted in 1950, which he entered in 1943. After 
his time at the seminary, he worked at another Catholic institution in Kigali starting in 1949. By 
the early 1950s, Kayibanda was in contact with Belgian colonial leaders, working as a secretary 
to senior White Fathers, and editor for several of the Catholic-sponsored magazines.185 
Kayibanda had social mobility, linguistic skills, practical experience teaching in classrooms and 
to the public, and he had the trustworthiness of the White Fathers. He stood on the springboard 
of the White Fathers, poised and ready to enter a position of power.  
The creation of TRAFIPRO, while funded mostly by the Church and which Father Louis 
Pien advocated for, was not a solely original idea of the White Fathers. Originally built out of the 
coffee cooperative that Gregoire Kayibanda had created with influence from the priest’s 
exposure to cooperatives in Europe, TRAFIPRO not only served economic and agricultural 
purposes, but also political.186 For the White Fathers, it provided a space to model options for 
agricultural workers that were alternates to communism. For the Hutu évolués, it provided a 
space for political meetings, teaching of skills, and establishment or increase of networks. The 
évolués therefore had social, economic, and political infrastructures to support their growing 
political discourse, and Kayibanda had a significant leadership role within these structures to 
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“awaken the political consciousness of the Hutu masses.”187 This displays that while “The 
Manifesto of the Bahutu” may have been the first public and international response to these 
contemporary conversations, it was not the first social response nor the first written response to 
events.  For example, TRAFIPRO itself was a community response to self-organize, and various 
forms of the press existed that provided written debates. Despite this evidence of political action, 
“Mise au Point” was different stimulus for the évolués. This publication from the CSP hit a nerve 
of the évolués, and they “hurried to react” and responded with their own direct address.188 
 When Kayibanda and his eight peers wrote their manifesto, they addressed it to the 
Belgian colonial governor general, Jean-Paul Harroy. Harroy only revealed this fact in this 
memoir as he tries to establish his limited interactions with the leaders of the “Hutu peasantry” 
who only rarely organized publicly, he claims, otherwise they were usually “in the shadows” or 
“in hiding.”189 The organization may have been in private, but the spreading of news occurred 
publicly, as Harroy also describes, and this resulted in a pitting of mwami Mutara against 
Kayibanda, “a merciless dual between Nyanza’s Goliath and Kabgayi’s David.”190 There is no 
doubt Harroy knew how the story of David and Goliath ended in the Bible, just he knew how the 
history of the Independence movement in Rwanda ended from his experiences. In short, the 
underestimated and presumed unskilled David (Hutu) attacked the proud giant (Tutsi ruling elite) 
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with his unsophisticated weaponry and then slayed the giant with their weapon to ensure total 
victory.191 Again, Hutu actions demonstrated how the tools of ‘civilization’ empowered the 
‘uncivilized.’ The Belgians saw the act of ‘civilizing’ as giving the Hutu social tools for 
improvement, but then the Hutu used these very tools to destroy existing social structures.  
Therefore, analyzing the Hutu évolués retort to the CSP’s “Mise au Point” shows at face value 
the system that they deemed needed remedying, but deeper also illustrates the Hutu évolués 
sense of identity that support this demand for change.  
Gregoire Kayibanda and his fellow believers in the injustice of Tutsi reign over Hutu had 
certainly not been silent prior to the publication of the “Hutu Manifesto.”192 They routinely 
shared the published news from hill to hill throughout Rwanda, traveling and reading the 
newspaper or magazines to share it rapidly across communities.193 There was especially a 
connection with the shared media and Kayibanda’s role as editor of these forms of print media, 
whether it was Kinyamateka or L’Ami. Besides the verbal sharing of written communication, 
there was also the work of TRAFIPRO which served as a modeling community from which 
Kayibanda drew support and supporters for this political action.194 However, these were all local 
and internal actions to building a movement and gaining support. The fact that “Hutu Manifesto” 
both aimed regionally and nationally, and external to Rwanda shows that this document worked 
to do something different than the cohort’s work previously did. The reason that it did was 
different was because the previous month’s publication of “Mise au Point” was the catalyst, not 
only railing against the systematic social injustice.195  Therefore, with this motivation, the writers 
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needed to be precise with their language, to enumerate injustices, and to suggest improvements. 
They needed simultaneously to rally their supporters and convince their nay-sayers in order to 
exert power and enact change. They needed a manifesto.  
“The Hutu Manifesto” 
 The “Hutu Manifesto” successfully shows the Hutu évolués focused on identifying and 
remedying the “indigenous racial problem in Ruanda.”196 They existed as the subordinated 
group, but their identity exists as more than that. They see this systematic subordination as the 
root of all economic, social, political, and cultural problems. Without undoing the oppressive 
system supporting this “monopoly,” they write, Rwanda could not travel “the road to genuine 
democratization.”197 Proof of the Hutu évolués’s identification and goals exists in their use of 
vocabulary, their frame of reference, and allusions in their text. Enumeration, analysis, and 
synthesis of these features within the text illustrate the group’s expressed identity. Individually 
these express identity tendencies but together these narrative tools provide an entire image, a 
snapshot in time to illustrate how the Hutu évolués saw themselves and understood their 
relationship within society.   
The vocabulary and the language of these words is the most pronounced and diverse 
narrative feature of the “Hutu Manifesto” and reveals the agency of the évolués in this complex 
political situation. Being a manifesto, their purpose is, yes, to respond to the CSP, but also to 
gather support and convince others of their perspective. Therefore, this manifesto casts a wide 
net to engage a broad audience and aimed to engage this audience through its impassioned 
explanations of problems and suggested remedies in Rwandan society. The writers accomplish 
this through writing in the first person and writing in multiple languages.  
                                                   
196 United Nations Trusteeship Council, “Report on Ruanda-Urundi (T/1402),” 39. 
197 United Nations Trusteeship Council, 39 & 42. 
Rollinson 
 45 
Similar to “Mise au Point,” “Hutu Manifesto” utilizes the first-person plural pronouns to 
evoke a sense of community among the writers and the readers of the manifesto. In this way, 
they assert goals, beliefs, and aspirations that implicitly reference the group dynamic to the 
writing as well as invite other readers (or listeners) of the manifesto to join the cause.  Further, 
this consistent incorporation throughout the manifesto emphasizes the identity of the writers 
behind the ideas. It is not that something should be done by someone about social inequality in 
Rwanda, instead it is that “we will endeavor to shed some light on this matter.”198 It is not 
colonialism and paternalism wherein an unrelated party steps in to defend another for personal 
gain, it is that “we desire […the] advancement of the Muhutu” and “[we aim to convince] the 
authorities of the thinking and specific desires of the people to which we belong.”199 They 
identify as Hutu and with the skills and experiences they possess, they speak for the group.  
The second way that the Kayibanda and his peers aim to garner the attention of a large 
group is through their emphasis on linguistic diversity and compromise. They accomplish this 
with the use of three languages: French, Latin, and Kinyarwandan. Again, the same as “Mise au 
Point,” the writers of the manifesto wrote the document in French. This makes sense since they 
were writing this to governor Harroy, but it also has the advantage that it could then be in direct 
dialogue with “Mise au Point.” Both works were in French, and could reach the same 
international audience, specifically Belgium and the UN Trusteeship Council. The price of using 
the language of the colonial government effectively acted as a compromise of the évolués’ 
culture of origin, but the price bought them access to a large, international audience.  
 The second language used in the manifesto is Latin. The periodic incorporation of Latin 
phrases furthers the writers’ ability to gain access to European audiences, but its incorporation 
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does more than that. In a sense showing off their advanced education from the White Fathers, the 
additional phrases act as a nudge to a Western reader to assert the évolués as peers to 
international political leaders. In one reference, the writers divulge that a group of Hutu and 
some Tutsi youth use the phrase “in itineribus semper” (always on the road or on a journey) as a 
motto, perhaps aimed to give legitimacy to this group through its use of an ancient European 
language.200   Similarly, they invoke the phrase “ceteris paribus” (all else being equal) while 
arguing for educational reforms, relying on this phrase as an standard logical caveat.201 While 
these inclusions are interesting, it is especially interesting to consider these to Kayibanda’s 
available biography. It already does not mention his fluency in Kinyarwandan, his native 
language, and these Latin references raise the question if perhaps he was also fluent in Latin. Of 
course, one of the other eight writers could have also been proficient and insisted on inserting 
these phrases. Or perhaps it was too obvious to mention, an unextraordinary skill of a graduate of 
the White Fathers’ education, just as expected as fluency of the native tongue of one’s native 
land.  Regardless of the reason though, the usage of Latin bolsters the usage of French to 
emphasize the évolués’ audience. 
The third language that the évolués use in the “Hutu Manifesto” is Kinyarwandan. 
Staying consistent with keeping their intended audience as the focal point, their use of 
Kinyarwandan phrases are contextualized, expected, and only periodic. Unlike the Latin phrases, 
which they use fluently and without translation or explanation (thus anticipating that their 
audience perfectly understands their usage), the native Rwandan phrases have context associated 
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each time. Whether it is a definition of the phrase “respect for the culture and customs of the 
country” or classification as “[royal] court drummers,” each time the writers provide a 
description.202 This shows that they are walking a fine line, they have a focus on their European 
audience while also striving to maintain legitimacy within their own culture. They may be 
defining the Kinyarwandan words in French, but they still use the Kinyarwandan words.  They 
may speak a language that enables communication with colonial powers, but they still are 
members of their own cultural community.  
The second narrative tool that the writers used to express their argument and their identity 
is their selected frame of reference. Contrary to “Mise au Point,” the writers repeatedly express a 
profoundly rigid internal frame of reference that centers on Rwandan race relations. Just as 
CSP’s “Mise au Point” discussed education and politics, so does “Hutu Manifesto.” As 
“Manifesto” discusses each element of society and government that needs a remedy, each time 
the writers describe that the core of a problem is preferential treatment of Tutsi at the expense of 
Hutu. By successfully linking power to ethnicity as well as precolonial Rwandan culture to 
colonial manipulation, the évolués display that this was a complex social system that did exist 
and needed deliberate attention to enact change within it.203 Their message through the “Hutu 
Manifesto” is clear: we cannot address any other problems without addressing the problem of 
social inequality first. Therefore, in order to address these problems, the évolués seek European 
alliance which becomes most apparent in the third tool – allusions.  
The last category of analysis of the “Hutu Manifesto” reviews and analyzes the allusions, 
either as examples or explanations, that the évolués utilized. During the évolués’ discussion of 
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what they perceive as the various Tutsi monopolies within Rwandan culture, they incorporate 
several Western European elements to display cultural openness and Rwandan cultural 
references to display their core cultural belonging. The Western references successfully articulate 
their openness to European culture, and the original writing of the document in French also acts 
in parallel to these references, which in combination show not just a willingness to engage with 
Europeans but to do some so on European cultural terms. Simultaneously, however, the writers 
of the manifesto do not neglect to incorporate some Rwandan cultural references. This 
combination of allusions expresses a cultural heritage from both groups – Rwandan genealogy 
and European education.  
 The European-based references that the évolués include are more prominent than 
Rwandan references in the manifesto and cover mostly political and legal ground. For example, 
they argue for political inclusion of the European colonists.204 This is a fascinating inclusion 
given that several years prior in the Belgian Congo a group of white colonists gathered together 
to assert their perceived right for political agency within the colonies.205 The évolués also argue 
for a piecemeal transition to a Western legal tradition, specifically by codifying laws and 
requiring a “legal recognition of individual land ownership in the Western sense of the word.”206 
These two references combined aim to pull in European colonists and push Rwanda towards a 
European tradition, thus displaying to colonial powers that Rwanda is on the path to become 
independent. They further articulate this by stating what could happen if Rwanda stays on its 
current route without changes: communism. 207  The threat, or even mere mention, that parts of 
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Africa would fall to the evils of communism was a great fear of the Western powers, most 
especially true for the United States of America.208  There is a final reference the évolués include 
with Europeans as the focal audience. In this reference, the évolués aimed to invalidate the 
inherent presumption that “the Mututsi are […] born to rule,” a heavenly mandate for Rwanda.209  
To contest this with Europeans, they counterargue that “the same virtue may take a different 
form in an Italian than in a German, in an Englishman than in a Japanese, in a Fleming than in a 
Walloon.”210 This comparison of senior-subordinate powers of not only sovereign states but the 
intrinsic division within Belgium is striking. What these references show overall, more than 
ambitions for political alliance or that the authors are highly educated – all of which is true – is 
that they know their political opponents. How do they know the Europeans so well? The same 
way they can speak European languages and know cultural references – Europeans were the 
source of the évolués’ Western education. Used as a civilizing force by Europeans, the évolués 
successfully employ these same tools as they aimed to win political favor. 
Despite the fact that most of the references in the “Hutu Manifesto” are Euro-centric, there 
are some that focus on Rwandan culture. Just as the inclusion of Kinyarwandan noted, the 
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évolués discuss several cultural phrases and groups in society, to include the biru. As the overall 
“keepers of tradition,” they acted as court drummers, advisors on tradition, and final authority on 
a king’s successor.211 Although brief, this reference is significant as it reflects cultural 
knowledge about Rwanda regarding the existence and the role of the biru.   
The “Hutu Manifesto,” written in March 1957, is in direct dialogue with “Mise au Point,” 
written in February. Kayibanda and his peers directly confront “the Tutsi High Council.”212 This 
confrontation is obvious when they contend that “No solution of the Mututsi-Belgian relations 
[i.e. discussions within “Mise au Point”] can be durable until the fundamental difficulties 
between the Mututsi and the Muhutu are settled.”213 Their vocabulary displays their sense of 
collective group inclusion, but also betrays their advanced education with their writing in French, 
emphatic Latin incorporation, and inclusion of Kinyarwandan phrases. Their frame of reference 
is internal to Rwanda, focusing on the social, cultural, political, and economic inequality of the 
preferential treatment to Tutsi. Lastly, their references primarily aim to convince their European 
audience of the integrity of their argument and the potential consequences of failure to act in 
solidarity with the évolués. The few Rwandan cultural references included strive to show 
solidarity to their compatriots. Combined, these features communicate how the évolués identify 
within Rwandan society.  
While the évolués presented a compelling discussion and fought to bring attention to a 
deep social inequality in Rwanda, it is nevertheless important to recognize that this group had the 
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skills, time, and ability to engage in these significant conversations on an international level. 
This fact, and the cumulative life experiences that they received that resulted in those skills, 
shows the exceptionalism of this group as compared to other Hutu in Rwanda at the time and as 
compared to other historical sources. However, their existence as a non-representative population 
does not invalidate them as a historical source.  They may not have been the Hutu farmer 
struggling through uburtwa, ubuhake, corvée, and working for their own livelihood, as some 
Hutu were.  However, despite this exceptional status, these Hutu were still members of their 
communities, shaped by them and originating from them. This manifesto, although written by 
elites, still shares the perspective of Hutu and provides a valuable perspective to counterbalance 
against other sources that focus on solely European perspectives.  
 
Rwandan Political Leadership Responds 
It might be easy to assume that political leaders largely ignored a sassy manifesto of a 
subjugated group fighting to upturn a country’s political system. That assumption is incorrect. 
Instead, the publishing of this manifesto resulted in the writers of the document receiving a 
personal and in-person death threat from mwami Mutara himself.214 This threat shows the 
Rwanda internal response and proves that the mwami took the text and political pressuring from 
it seriously, even if he initially tried to ignore it.  
Following release of the “Hutu Manifesto,” the Hutu clamored for discussion of the ideas 
presented on a more public scale. Instead, mwami Mutara denied the conversation. The king 
continued to delay and ignore, and so the time passed…the Jubilee celebration occurred in June 
and July…the UN Trusteeship Council visited in September. It was not until a full year later that 
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the king relented and allowed meetings to commence. In March 1958, ten Hutu and ten Tutsi met 
together to form “the Hutu-Tutsi Study Commission.”215 There were approximately ten or twenty 
Hutu and Tutsi at the commission, but no matter the count, the event went poorly for the Hutu.216 
They found that they had been disillusioned, falling from the excitement and pride of being 
called to the royal capital to speak with the king, to being accused as traitors and “haters of 
Rwanda” and “enemies of the king [and] enemies of the country,” and this usually was 
punishable by death.217 The threat almost came to fruition for one Hutu, Joseph Gitera. There are 
varying accounts on what happened and specifically on what date, but sometime between April 
to June 1958 during the commission meetings, mwami Mutara either forcefully grabbed Gitera’s 
throat or walked up to Gitera and whispered to him, “…be careful, Joseph…” as he made a clear 
mime with his hands of strangling Gitera.218  
 Despite this animosity, the Commission eventually finished and determined that there 
was at least some measure of Hutu-Tutsi tension, but it also finished having significantly injured 
the Hutu vision of the king. Traditionally, the king was superior to the divisions of Tutsi, Hutu, 
or Twa, for he was king for all Rwandans.219 But threats from the king and rejection of the king 
by a Hutu representative was only the beginning. Once the Commission did finish their inquiry, 
they presented their results to the CSP and the mwami, the president of the CSP.220 The CSP, 
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based “on the mwami’s recommendation […] rejected all of the committee’s conclusions.”221 
These leaders did not stop there, however. Mutara flat-out denied that any animosity between 
Hutu and Tutsi existed, and the CSP prohibited use of the ethnic terms Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa in 
government records.222 The Hutu were furious and increased their resistance to the Tutsi-top-
heavy government.223 This was exactly what they had argued against in their manifesto – 
“Therefore, in order to keep a close check on this racial monopoly, we strongly oppose, for the 
time being at least, the discontinuance of the practice of entering Muhutu, Mututsi, or Mutwa on 
official or personal identity cards.” It would make it far too easy, they argued, to lose sight of 
acts of segregation and lose the ability to empirically notice discriminatory practices without 
noting group belonging.224 Nevertheless, these internal disagreements remained. In the next two 
years, Mutara would be dead, his half-brother replaced him and then exiled, and the Hutu 
Uprising inverted the power dynamic whereby Hutu took charge of the country.225 Over the 
following two years, Rwanda became independent from Belgian colonial rule in 1962 and also 
exercised the first Hutu-led massacre of Tutsi.226 The “Hutu Manifesto,” and its catalyst, “Mise 
au Point,” made an incontrovertible influence on Rwanda’s trajectory for the rest of the century.  
 As this chapter has shown, the Hutu have been key actors in the historical narrative of 
Rwanda’s history during the Twentieth Century. They enabled the White Father’s success in 
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Rwanda by providing them an audience to evangelize, and in return, the Hutu received an 
education and social opportunities that provided some of this group the opportunity to advance 
socially. These opportunities and honed skills, especially in language and cultural education, 
directly enabled the Hutu évolués to publish a public contradiction to their national leaders’ 
statement in early 1957. This manifesto and the events that followed show that the Rwandans 
were in dialogue about their own future, they were not simply relying on Belgian colonial leaders 
to create it for them. As part of this dialogue, it is essential that the manifesto describes racial or 
ethnic relations from the évolués perspective, as this is key to understanding Rwanda in the years 
that independence become increasingly imminent.227 Lastly, as the next chapter will discuss, 
these discussions prior to the UN’s visit in late 1957 received attention and successfully 
legitimized the évolués. Doing so assisted in replacing Rwandan social structures of deference to 
the king and Catholic church with a rising sense of nationalism.228 The insistence present in the 
“Hutu Manifesto” to identify the deeply-held social inequality within Rwandan culture and to 
work to shift it was a significant event that directly influenced Rwanda’s immediate future.  
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Chapter 4: The UN, Belgium and the US Respond, 1954-1960 
 
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act  
towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” 
 Article I, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 
 
“Our country [Belgium] undertook the task of developing them 
 and raising the population as a whole to a level  
of civilization comparable to our own.”  
The Ten-Year Plan of Ruanda-Urundi, 1952 
 
Mason Sears was a troublemaker. Or at least, that is what the United States Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles, thought of him. Sears had been a member of the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council’s Visiting Mission to Ruanda-Urundi in 1954 and, while in the position of a 
nominated member to the UN and representative of the United States government, had expressed 
support for a timeline for decolonization and statement that directly contradicted official US 
policy. He suggested “time limits for the attainment of various stages of self-government,” 
instead of reminding his fellow men on the Mission that the “task of infinite difficulty and 
delicacy, (and) zeal needs to be balanced by patience.”229 Perhaps fortunately for Sears and to 
reduce his chances of getting in trouble again, the United States did not need to nominate a 
representative for the subsequent Visiting Mission in 1957. Instead, the four representatives of 
the mission came from Haiti, Australia, Burma, and France.230 For Dulles, it was less that Sears 
had misspoken and more that Sears’ stance was not only a public but also an international 
misstep for US policy. International discourses about colonial rule included the US since at least 
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after the First World War. Specifically, the US was part of the deliberation wherein Belgium 
accepted the colonial mandate of Ruanda-Urundi as an outcome of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Likewise, the US government reviewed draft agreements when the League of Nations Mandate 
changed to a United Nations Trusteeship, which Belgium still oversaw, in 1942.231 Since the US 
was consistently involved with these processes, it is not surprising that the US government was 
still a member of this official international conversation into and past the 1950s. This is 
noteworthy because of the US’s involvement, but also the status of domestic and international 
affairs that increases the significance of America’s involvement.232 US domestic affairs included 
significant racial tensions in the era of Jim Crow laws. This combined with Red Scares and anti-
communism tied the Civil Rights movement to communism in the eyes of US officials. The US 
government did not want this connection to leave its borders, especially not to make its way to 
Africa. Officials specifically feared that the US would lose legitimacy if groups equated 
domestic racial tensions to decolonization, and they feared that communism would overtake 
Africa, therefore disrupting the delicate power balances keeping the Cold War from becoming 
one of hot combat.   Indeed, US domestic issues were not separate from international action. US 
actions had indirect involvement with African colonial affairs via the UN, which the US used as 
a tool of foreign policy.  Belgium and the UN Trusteeship Council, separated by one degree of 
hierarchy, oversaw the colony of Ruanda-Urundi. This two-tiered oversight aided in creating the 
false binary that it was either Belgium or the UN who moved Ruanda-Urundi in the direction of 
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independence.233 While significant actions from both parties were catalysts for this process, it is 
also important to remember the role that Rwandans played as well.   
The US, Belgium, and the UN were various nodes of an intricate network, further 
complicated by representations of individuals and organizations, domestic or foreign policies.  
The interactions of this vast network show simultaneously the level of international attention on 
Rwanda in the late 1950s as well as Western powers’ low expectations of Rwandans. This 
chapter highlights Rwanda’s role in the history of the United Nations and will investigate three 
elements of these international exchanges. First, it identities and discusses the intersection of 
these international interactions. Second, it discusses the extent to which Rwandans successfully 
manipulated the UN Visiting Mission’s priorities prior to their visit in September and October of 
1957. Lastly, it will analyze and describe to what degree the United Nations did or did not 
support human rights in Ruanda-Urundi.234 This chapter concludes by stating the Rwandans were 
a significant actor in the process to achieve independence, in addition to the Belgians and the 
UN, even though in the short term Rwandan political influence was not as significant as hoped. 
This shows Rwandan agency in these larger historical processes even to the point of forwarding 
the process of genocide. Within these interactions, human rights abuses continued, but elicited 
minimal concern from the UN. This disregard occurred despite the requirements of Article 76 of 
the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.235 This, therefore, displays that 
discrimination, the third stage of genocide, is clearly established at the conclusion of the 1950s. 
This atmosphere then enabled the fourth phase of genocide, dehumanization, to take root.  
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 Preparations for the Visiting Mission of 1957 at the UN consisted of creating the Mission 
itself. This required selecting four men from different countries represented on the Trusteeship 
Council to ensure that Mission composition changed each visit. In Rwanda, there were also 
preparations. Before each Visiting Mission, Rwanda experienced a flurry of political activity to 
display that it was continuing to improve socially and politically to the UN’s satisfaction. For 
example, during a previous visit in 1954, the mwami officially prohibited certain types of forced 
labor.236 In February 1957, the Conseil Supérieur du Pays (CSP) published an official 
communication for the Visiting Mission to review prior to their visit in September, which 
reviewed the CSP’s goals and methods to proceed towards independence. The Hutu évolués also 
read the communication and, shocked at how it failed discuss the intense subordination and 
abuse of Hutu, published a response that included a discussion of the entrenched preferential 
social treatment of Tutsi over Hutu. These written conversations initiated the beginning 
movements that resulted in the revolution two years later. As Rwandans moved into this future, 
these publications and Western responses demarcate Rwandan’s choosing to accept the colonial 
language and ethnic divisions between Hutu and Tutsi.237 By means of analyzing these 
exchanges, these highlight the labor and human rights abuses that took place in Ruanda-Urundi. 
 Even though the UN oversaw the trusteeship system and possibly had more capability 
and power than Belgium, Belgium’s relationship with the trusteeship territory of Ruanda-Urundi 
was politically continuous and contiguous by nature of the metropole-colony connections and the 
presence of colonial officials in residence in Ruanda-Urundi. This contrasted with the UN 
Visiting Mission’s intermittent inspection visits to the territory that occurred approximately 
every three years. Considering how first Belgium responded to the political activity in Rwanda in 
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1957 shows their perspective of these political movements and reveals their treatment of human 
rights.  
To reference the entirety of a government as a group actor is sometimes necessary. After 
all, while the Belgian government may be a group of people, this group aims to act in concert to 
accomplish domestic and foreign policy goals. If this were the case (as it will be later when 
discussing the perspective of the US), then a nebulous reference to a faceless bureaucratic entity 
would be both helpful and adequate to describe this group’s actions. However, in this situation, 
the expression of Belgium’s official stance on Ruanda-Urundi came not from a bureau but from 
the governor: Jean-Paul Harroy. 
 Harroy became governor of Ruanda-Urundi in 1955, a decade after he completed his 
doctoral dissertation on the degradation of African soil as a consequence of colonialism.238 Since 
that time, Harroy worked with UNESCO regarding the “African floral and fauna,” continuing to 
study soil science.239 If one wonders how Harroy became Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, it seems 
that Harroy wondered himself. As he described the offer from the Belgian Minister of Colonies, 
he recalls first being asked if was seated before the delivery of the proposition: “Do you want to 
become the governor of Ruanda-Urundi?”240 He started a few months before the Bandung 
Conference and then two years after filling the position, Harroy witnessed unfold the interactions 
between the Hutu and Tutsi elites regarding the UN’s 1957 Visiting Mission.241  
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In his role, Harroy shouldered the yoke of representing the Belgian government during 
the subsequent UN visits.243 But whether he anticipated it or not, the position required it, and so 
when the Visiting Mission interviewed him three-quarters of the way through the visit, his 
responses expressed not only Monsieur Harroy’s views but also those of the Kingdom of 
                                                   
242 United Nations, “T/1201,” 29.  
243 There are additional sources that relay more directly the Belgian government’s opinions and goals of 
Ruanda-Urundi. These annual Reports of the Administering Authority do exist in the United Nations’ archive, but 
this author was not able to obtain access to them prior to the deadline for this research.  
From “Administration of the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi: report of the Government of Belgium for the 
year 1954 (T/1201, A/3177),” by Belgian Minister of Colonies and United Nations Secretary-General, © 1956 




Belgium. Harroy hints at this dual role of an individual representing a larger entity when he 
begins to describe “‘my’ reactions to the historical phenomena that took place around me,” the 
quotations indicating that his views are than just for one person.244 When the Visiting Mission 
questioned him about the Rwandan political exchange from February to March 1957, he 
responded with the following:  
This is the key problem of the country. The whole history of Ruanda and Urundi 
led the minority group of Tutsi … to subjugate politically, socially and 
economically the majority Hutu…where it is fair to recognize that in the past, the 
dominant class brought services (mainly, security, order and protection) to the 
dominated class. Contemporary evolution has practically emptied the role of Tutsi 
protector of Hutus; but, remanence of the past, the habit remains in the hopes that 
the Tutsi are entitled to expect benefits from the Hutu […] The Hutu, formerly 
without reaction, acquired the results of education and increased economic 
strength and, as a result, started to protest more and more strongly against the 
latest states of affairs that made it impossible for Tutsi to insist on them certain 
types of benefits. These protests were once rare and cautious. A first sign of the 
Hutu's emancipation in motion is that these protests are beginning to multiply.245 
 
Harroy is not incorrect in his description. There is linguistic, social, and political evidence that 
Rwandan society elevated Tutsi at the expense of Hutu at least as far back as the mid-
seventeenth century.246 This tension preexisted within Rwandan society. And yet, Harroy does 
not acknowledge the influence of Belgian colonial rule in the early twentieth century as a factor 
in this cultural relationship. He does not remind his interviewers, and by extension the UN or its 
member nation-states, of how Belgium instituted identification cards in the 1930s or how 
Belgians worked with the White Father missionaries to establish and support divergent 
educational paths for Tutsi and Hutu. Of course, he had nothing to gain by divulging this past. 
Nevertheless, despite the preexisting divergence in Rwandan society, Belgium certainly had a 
                                                   
244 Harroy, Rwanda, 231. Original text: “…je m’efforce surtout de livrer “mes” reactions faces aux 
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245 Harroy, 231. 
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manipulative hand in the process. Harroy admits that the dichotomy that “Mise au Point” and 
“the Hutu Manifesto” exchanged was problematic and a deep social issue. While he also adds 
that this conversation with the UN created “an exceptional springboard and advertising agent” 
for the writers of the “Manifesto,” he does not articulate the nuances of how Belgium influenced 
this historical movement.247 Nevertheless, Harroy’s conviction agreeing with “this key problem” 
remains consistent that this social tension was “at the forefront of our [Belgian] concerns.”248  
 At first, Harroy appeared to be socially engaged, even progressive, in his support for this 
difficult conversation. While this snapshot looks favorable for Harroy, his tone throughout his 
memoir indicated a lack of seriousness and even mockery or ineptitude regarding his duties. 
Harroy, by the nature of his position as governor, legitimized the Rwandan discussion, which the 
UN further amplified through its incorporation in the 1957 Report.249 However, a few examples 
from his memoir hint at his personality and show the internal politics behind the curtain of 
bureaucratic window-dressing.  
 After describing his interview with the Visiting Mission, Harroy continues discussing 
related events, including the report “from the Dorsinville mission…”250 The reference here is not 
to a town or city, as the name might first indicate, but is instead to a person: the chairman of the 
Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, Max Dorsinville, ambassador from Haiti.251 
Here, Harroy does not call the Visiting Mission by its formal name, usually only as ‘the mission’ 
                                                   
247 Harroy, Rwanda, 232. Original text: “…auteurs de ce manifeste un tremplin et un agent de publicité 
exceptionnels.” 
248 Harroy, 231–32; United Nations, “T/1201,” 29. In this memoir excerpt, Harroy is expressing a shared 
reaction with the Belgian government department A.I.M.O. (Indigenous Affairs and Workforce), thus further 
displaying that his responses were not as an individual but as an official representative of Belgium. Also, in the 1954 
Belgian Report on Ruanda-Urundi, the organizational chart for the territory displays the Governor as the center of 
governance; all other agencies, services, and even the mwami of Ruanda and Urundi emanate from this position. 
This chart clearly shows that while the nations may have mwami, the governor is king of the territory.  
249 Harroy, Rwanda, 230 & 232.  
250 Harroy, 232 & 247. 
251 United Nations Trusteeship Council, “Report on Ruanda-Urundi (T/1402),” 1. 
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and twice by the chairman’s surname. This habitual reference by Harroy reveals how he 
perceives the UN’s visit – not as a group, such as ‘the UN,’ but as a real or proxy possession of 
an individual, “the Dorsinville mission.” There does not seem to be any references to 
Dorsinville’s Haitian citizenship, therefore this does not seem to be a nationalistic discussion. 
However, this specific reference shows Harroy’s complex interpretation of the visit, 
simultaneously oversimplifying the visit to a person, while also expressing distain for the UN as 
an international organization. 
 The visit in in 1957 was Harroy’s first introduction to Dorsinville but it was not the 
last.252 Two available photos from almost four years later illuminate more of the relationship 
between the two. In April 1961, the UN passed a resolution that berated Belgium for its failure to 
implement a previous resolution that supported political dialogue and encouraged political 
reconciliation.253 But to Harroy it was not just the UN had passed a resolution, it was also that 
these resolutions emplaced trust in the newly-created United Nations Commission for Ruanda 
whose chairman was none other than Max Dorsinville.254 Despite what Harroy asserted earlier in 
his memoir, there did not appear to be any love lost between Harroy and Dorsinville. Harroy 
included a photo of the two men with a caption stating that Dorsinville did not want to visit 
Ruanda-Urundi if he “[had] to meet Governor Harroy again.”255 Harroy, as if to respond to this 
retort with one of his own, uses not words but an image. Adjacent to the first photo, he inserted a 
small image of a cat. Harroy’s insolence and impertinence seeps through the page when he 
explains that “this is the expression of the cat Mimine as she was listening to Ambassador 
                                                   
252 Harroy, Rwanda, 221–22. 
253 United Nations, “Resolution 1579 (XV): Question of the Future of Ruanda-Urundi (A/RES/1579(XV)),” 
December 20, 1960, https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/1579(XV); United Nations, “Resolution 1605 (XV): Question of 
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Dorsinville talk to us about [the UN Resolutions].”256 Here, in Harroy’s own words, only the cat 
listened even though the UN ambassador spoke to both parties. This photographic conversation 
clashes with Harroy’s written recollections and illustrates the complex and intertwined 
relationship between himself and Dorsinville, and even by extension hints at the tension between 
Belgium and the UN. Further, it subsides the professional interaction of the international 
organization of the UN Visiting Mission traveling to Ruanda-Urundi to converse with the 
Governor down, in part, to the dynamic between two bickering men.  
 Temporarily setting aside these dynamics of personality enables a shift back to the 
institutional relationship between Belgium and the UN. The Visiting Mission, having finished its 
visit to Ruanda-Urundi in mid-October, released its report to the UN General Assembly in early 
1958.257 The Visiting Mission Report has an overall contradictory and condescending tone, and 
has a veneer of bureaucracy thinly covering the violent events in late 1950s. Their incorporation 
and discussion of “Mise au Point” and “Hutu Manifesto” does not escape this.  
 While the Mission’s report does directly address both Rwandan documents almost twenty 
times in addition to several indirect responses or incorporations of those author’s arguments, the 
acknowledgement of them does not dominate the report.258 Rather, when the Report is 
contextualized within its contemporary peoples or events, the elements that do dominate are the 
inconsistencies and the pretentious intonation within it. This context proves to be insightful for 
how the Visiting Mission then incorporates Rwandan dialogue.  
                                                   
256 Harroy, 456. Original text: “Une expression de la chatte Mimine alors qu’elle écoutait l’Ambassadeur 
Dorsinville nous parler de 1605.” The photo is a close-up of the cat, so it is impossible to contextualize if this photo 
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 The Visiting Mission expresses inconsistencies when it gives Belgians and Rwandans 
mixed feedback and when it categorizes the population of Ruanda-Urundi. These inconsistencies 
are not only mixed messages, but falsehoods, and show Western powers manipulating 
information for their own means. The first prominent inconsistency is their mixed signals in 
communicating the progress of the colonial project. The Mission distributes both criticism and 
praise towards Belgium. It praises them for their inclusion of young girls and “racial integration” 
in education and the overall economic, social, and political progress they had overseen.259 The 
Mission even took some time to express how “certain European circles” disagree with some of 
the political changes in Ruanda-Urundi, but ultimately dismisses it as the political progress is “an 
important step towards creating an organic bond between the two States.”260 However, the 
Mission also gives these mixed signals to the Hutu and Tutsi. They praise the Tutsi (they “have a 
remarkable political and social sense”) but also compliment the Hutu (for no longer being 
“impassive” as they “once [were]”). 261 
The second inconsistency prevalent in the report is the Mission’s reference to the 
population as being “homogenous despite its diverse ethnic composition.”262 Categorizing 
Ruanda-Urundi as homogenous is false, despite the caveat. Reviewing Belgian statistics on 
Ruanda-Urundi’s population proves this. The diversity included: three Ruandan and Burundian 
                                                   
259 United Nations Trusteeship Council, paras. 272, 235. 
260 United Nations Trusteeship Council, paras. 77 & 87; Claussen et al., “The Consul General at 
Leopoldville (Mallon) to the Department of State.” This reference by the Mission is brief but meaningful as it 
alludes to the political movement that the United States’ Department of State noted in 1953. Primarily organized by 
Belgian colonists living in Central Africa, “The Central African Congress” was a white settler supremacist 
movement that aimed for “massive white immigration” to aid “the natives’ climb toward civilization.” As such, this 
group believed in greater settler involvement in government and a significant decrease in the UN’s “meddling and 
hypocrisy” in the region, which they attribute to the undue influence of non-Western European nation-states having 
too much power within the UN. In attendance of this conference was the current Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, as 
well as the Belgian would, in 1954, would become the Minister of Colonies and hire Harroy – August Buisseret. 
261 United Nations Trusteeship Council, “Report on Ruanda-Urundi (T/1402),” paras. 22 & 34. 
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ethnic groups, Europeans from 30 countries263; several thousand occupants from “the Asian 
race” (spanning Ethiopia and British territories in East Africa to Oman, Pakistan, Iran, 
Balochistan, Yemen, and India)264; African “non-indigenous” groups (such as Congolese); and 
the métis or “mixed-breed.”265 Therefore, from even a cursory look at Ruanda-Urundi’s 
population data, it is evident that that this region was not homogenous and the Mission’s attempt 
to claim so is incorrect, likely politically motivated to validate the otherwise illogical combining 
of Ruanda and Urundi into one nation. 
 The Visiting Mission expresses a third inconsistency when they discuss UN petitions; in 
this, they also convey a condescending tone in the report. As the Mission sees it, the purpose of 
petitions is for persons stuck between “the official views of the European or indigenous 
Administration[s]” to receive “a third party[‘s]” advice or aid.266 However, given the casual 
mockery they exhibit with two specific but long-term cases, it is little wonder that the UN did not 
receive a plethora of petitions for assistance, as they claim to expect.267 It seems that those who 
fit the model of advancement within the colonial mold received more consideration, whereas 
those who did not meet this criteria did not receive attention, funds, legal assistance, or other 
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means of intervention.268 Additionally, the Mission does not acknowledge the barrier that the 
process itself poses to a potential petitioner. As one petitioner described it, he received 
instructions to send his petition to the Governor (Harroy), who would send the letter to the 
Belgian Minister of Colonies (Buisseret), who would then send it to the final destination of the 
UN Trusteeship Council.269 Most of the eleven petitions from 1956 to 1958 express at least 
intense subordination to the Belgian government or governor, if not directly state the author’s 
fear of reprisal for writing the petition, regardless of the content. Lack of petitions bewildered the 
Mission, they did not understand why more people do not seek their assistance. They were blind 
to the process’s skewed power dynamics and how it necessitated a person’s vulnerability. 
Moreover, the Mission mocks those petitions submitted anonymously in a likely attempt to avoid 
this retribution. They call the anonymous writers “malcontents” who “[resent…] being losers”, 
“misinformed” with “excessive [and] unwarranted” comments, as well as other general 
pejorative statements.270 
 The Mission’s condescending tone also shades its incorporation and discussion of “Mise 
au Point” and “Hutu Manifesto.” Most notably in their report, they do not put the two documents 
into conversation chronologically, an odd articulation since Harroy understood the documents in 
conversation with each other and the Mission clearly saw Harroy as an authority figure and 
                                                   
268 United Nations, “Petition from Mr. Mohamed Bin Foz Concerning Ruanda-Urundi (T/PET.3/90),” 
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relied on his interpretation of the situation.271 They do provide attention to each of the documents 
briefly, but thoroughly summarizing each one in turn.272 The Mission continues to reference the 
two documents throughout the report, integrating sometimes a confirmation of an issue or 
disagreeing with the expression of a partial element. The Mission calls the Hutu Manifesto 
“prudent” and says that “Mise au Point” is a “more reliable source” than the previously 
mentioned “misinformed petitioners.”273 However, the Mission does not engage in a debate with 
these documents. This shows that while they took them seriously enough to acknowledge the 
political dialogue, which legitimized it, they did not perceive that it had any true staying power 
that a debate might necessitate.274 While it was common for other discussions from the Conseil 
Supérieur du Pays to be the talk of the town in the local media, this attention from the Mission 
enabled something different.275 In this case, as the governor agreed, these debates highlighted the 
“key problem” in the nation and Mission’s discussion only furthered this dialogue.276  
This springboard, however, did not launch the conversation to the levels of the US federal 
government’s awareness. It is true that American foreign policy focused on the African continent 
in the 1950s. Although the focal points of the policy changed through the years, it did not home 
in on a micro-event that clearly fell under the purview of the territory’s colonial power. Initially, 
US foreign policy focused on Africa, whereas later in the decade it would shift to a focus on 
Africans. The initial focus prioritized resources, including minerals and especially uranium, and 
land accessibility for potential military and other strategic uses. The pining for resources was 
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real, especially given that Ruanda-Urundi exported 2,771 tons of “ore and metals” in 1954.277 
This focus on the gains of the territory also included a focus on Belgium, most especially and 
repeatedly its tendency to be “highly sensitive to any criticism of her colonial administration.” 278 
Harroy shared this sensitivity, especially from critiques from the UN.  He defended Belgium’s 
work, especially when discussing the violent tools of Belgium’s empire. As he described the 
recently reduced and nearly-prohibited practice of whipping, Harroy seems almost wistful for the 
“presence of the strong method” whose forbidden usage was not only “repudiated by the whole 
of the native hierarchy” but contributed to the Belgians loss of authority of the peoples of 
Ruanda-Urundi, too.279 As if to support his defense of “being abused and treated as an odious 
colonist,” he also relays the story of his Rwandan cook from 1937 who he claims said, 
“Nowadays, there are no more Whites. You hesitate to give the chicotte…you are not real chiefs. 
[…] in 1905 – I saw a German [officer] … [hang] twenty people on trees [in one week]. That 
was a man!”280A second example of Harroy’s sharing the defensiveness of his countrymen is 
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278 David H. Stauffer et al., eds., “Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State [on Belgium],” in 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III (Washington: Government Printing 
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280 Harroy, 237 & 246 Original Text: " Avec la certitude de me faire injurier et traiter d'odieux colonialiste, 
je rapporterai ici ce que m'a dit à Rutshuru en 1937, quand je dirigeais le Parc national Albert, mon cuisinier 
rwandais Shabani: «De nos jours, il n'y a plus de Blancs. Vous hésitez à donner la chicote. Vous ne pendez plus. 
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" ; United Nations Trusteeship Council, “Report on Ruanda-Urundi (T/1402),” para. 243; United Nations, 
“Petition from Ex-Chief Barnabe Ntunguka Concerning Ruanda-Urundi (T/PET.3/72/Add.1),” June 21, 1954, 72; 
Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1999), 120–27. In the 1957 Mission 
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from his first few months as governor in early 1955. When a local priest requested his 
permission to work with his parishioners to build their own cathedral (instead of wading through 
the bureaucratic process via the Minister of Colonies in Brussels), Harroy approved the bishop to 
forgo the bureaucracy and gave permission to use local labor believing that “it is healthy for the 
people to build their own cathedral.”281 Proud of himself, Harroy concludes assuring the reader 
of his memoir that he never had issues with that diocese because of this willingness to share his 
power with those in the territory.  These two examples show that Harroy cared deeply about his 
reputation and how others perceived him, traits that he exemplifies on behalf of Belgium.  He 
tells these stories to assure readers of how kind and generous he was as governor. 
The US focused on Belgian sensitivity, but they did not neglect their own. Across the 
1950s, American foreign policy increasingly became concerned with future bonds with Africa 
that would be “mutually advantageous economic relationships.”282 This hope for a continued 
relationship changed throughout the decade, however. The increased focus on US - African 
relations echoes a third trend in the 1950s: certainty. While the US started the decade certain that 
it would be “at least a decade” until political and economic events significantly shifted, only four 
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years later in 1957 foreign policy reports added a caveat to their title that these policies only 
applied “prior to the calendar year 1960…due to marked political changes probable [then].”283 
 This leads to the fourth trend of American foreign policy over the 1950s: new recognition 
of multiple groups in Africa. This recognition of groups displays not only the diverse and 
heterogeneous composition of populations, but also the interconnectedness of Africa as part of a 
global community. Official documents specifically begin acknowledging the presence of “Asian 
or other minorities” in 1958, even though report analysts had included white settlers as part of 
the demographic explanation since 1953.284 The demographic picture, or at least the official 
recognition of it, grew increasingly complex. The caveat for 1960 remained through 1958, 
although the 1959 it shifted to warn of the “increased likelihood of an eventual racial explosion,” 
and warned that several territories “will likely become independent [by 1964]…although 
[Ruanda-Urundi will do so] at a slower pace.”285  These discussions of change highlight the 
American perspective of events occurring in Africa, including reoccurring concerns with 
political and economic forces. By considering static concerns from these same reports, additional 
concerns become visible.  
 Although the American view of Central and East Africa shifted over the decade, there 
were concerns that remained consistent. The two most dominant themes present in the reports are 
fear of communism and acknowledgement (but failure to discuss) racism. From the Red Scares 
and the Cold War, the fear of communism comes as no surprise within the social and political 
climate of the United States. Reports from at least as early as 1922 and extending at least into the 
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1960s consistently mention needs to block access to land, resources, or people from communists 
as well as fears about decolonizing population’s vulnerability from communist invasion.286 In 
short, these express the policy of containment. The American foreign policy stance drew and 
relentlessly enforced this boundary to guard liberal democracy. 
 Foreign policy did not so clearly express the second policy that remained consistent. The 
idea, history, and elements of racism are deeply complex, and this paper only begins to outline 
them. Suffice it to say that 1950s American foreign policy did not appear to recognize any of the 
complexity of racism. Reports began to highlight that the US had limited ability to directly 
involve themselves in certain affairs given the “extremely distorted picture Africans have been 
given concerning the race problem,” and that policy recommended actions that would “seek to 
correct [the] distorted African view.”287 These politics seem to identify the perception that 
Africans did or could see a direct connection between the racial inequalities in the United States 
to relations between white settlers and Africans, as well as some forced internal hierarchies, such 
as the Tutsi and Hutu.288 The complicated, but consistent, treatment of racism is also apparent in 
the way the US incorporated the Union of South Africa in foreign policy. While included, reports 
routinely list South Africa as an exception to a policy, increased awareness of its influence on 
neighbors, or requiring encouragement to forego repressive policies.289 Only selectively 
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referencing South Africa’s policy of apartheid, the US policies inherently see but do not 
explicitly admit commonalities between apartheid and America’s Jim Crow laws.  Nevertheless, 
as the US transitioned into the 1960s, policy shifted. At the start of the new decade, foreign 
policy included a previously unstated phrase that did not change everything, but at least proves 
that some views had evolved: “Above all, [Africans] want to be accepted and to be treated as 
equals with dignity and respect.”290 
 With all this policy guidance – contradictions and inaccuracies from the UN, judgements 
and sweeping assertions from the US – Harroy felt frustrated.  From his perspective, Belgians 
made progress in Ruanda-Urundi. They abolished whipping and were investigating alterative 
disciplinary actions. Communities built more churches and cathedrals. Belgium’s Ten-Year plan 
from 1952 was progressing and created various democratic structures.291  The 1957 Mission 
urged a steady hand with the political progress but to also balance the social progress of 
elevating Hutu into higher echelons of society. 292 With the end of the decade, though, this 
encouragement for a steady transition turned to reprimand. In 1960, the UN scolded Harroy for 
not doing enough or doing it fast enough.293  Despite these frustrations, Harroy continued to 
work to remain compliant with the UN’s Charter and move towards independence, even with 
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Belgians in the Congo asserting their disagreement. Brussels, Harroy knew, reinforced him and 
that consoled him.294 
 While Harroy felt political pressures, it does not appear that Belgium felt similar pressure 
to ensure treatment of peoples in Ruanda-Urundi honored their human rights. Whipping gave 
way to lack of access to food. Churches continued to be sites of labor abuses with the governor’s 
blessing to use local labor to build new brick structures. These were not irregular occurrences, 
but the status quo under Belgian colonial rule, as shown by the casual, even blasé, incorporation 
of these events and others like it into official records. The United Nations Visiting Mission from 
1957 contributed to the continual existence of human rights abuses by stressing contradictory 
and confusing official policies that strove to invalidate those who voiced descent from the 
trusteeship system. Therefore, the Mission’s report did not represent an international 
organization acting as a bastion of idealism, but instead was that of a political organization that 
glossed over human rights abuses and mocked those who aimed to document those issues via 
petitions. The United States foreign policy over the course of the 1950s displayed behavior that 
was no better and failed to reckon with its own history and present as it produced policy to 
interact with the future African states. 
 As Stearns, Moyn, Mazower, and others have argued, nation-states comprised the UN 
and they were a significantly manipulative factor in its operation. Nation-states – especially the 
US - saw the UN as a tool of foreign policy, not an international, idealist actor. Much as Mason 
Sears, defender of timelines to independence in 1954, could not both express his personal 
opinions and those of the United States, nation-states themselves could not both defend their own 
interests and not usurp the idealist structure of the UN. As Amrith and Sluga argued, this 
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dynamic between the UN and its members was complex. Considering the UN’s actions over time 
shows that this dynamic was malleable, shaped to the goals of nation-states – and sometimes 
even individual – drivers of a process. The UN fell prey to this in in the late 1950s in Ruanda-
Urundi with the continued involvement of Dorsinville.  One element remains yet unanswered – 
during this era, who was the driving force for independence in Ruanda-Urundi - the UN or 
Belgium?  
Considering this question from the vantage point of Independence in 1962, emphasis falls 
to Belgium and not the UN. Therefore, it is not surprising that Africanist scholars do not usually 
prioritize the UN as an actor in this historical dialogue. Indeed, after the political dialogues of 
1957, it was the Belgians who supported the Hutu rise to power. They supported it generally, to 
protect their interests, and specifically, by appointing a Special Resident who would oust Tutsi 
leaders and fill their vacancies with Hutu.295 However, despite this known outcome, scholarship 
should work to avoid the temptation to consider this period around 1957 anachronistically. 
Actions in 1957 did not predetermine 1962’s Independence success.  
In the late 1950s, the UN was not one-dimensional and was still a major player for 
Ruanda-Urundi’s political stability. The UN’s diverse composition involved both American aims 
to use the organization as a political tool of foreign policy and Communist alliances on the 
Trusteeship Council aiming to outmaneuver Western powers in a microcosm of the Cold War.296 
The conversations that eventually led to independence, including the Rwandan political 
documents of “Mise au Point” and “the Hutu Manifesto,” had only just begun. In fact, homing in 
on 1957 reveals that the UN’s role was not trivial, as it was five years later, but significantly 
                                                   
295 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 53; Chrétien, The Great Lakes of Africa, 303; 
Carney, Rwanda Before the Genocide, 107. 
296 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, 53.  
Rollinson 
 76 
influential. The planned presence of the Visiting Mission in September 1957 was the catalyst for 
the year’s manifestoes. This visit, in combination with discussion over a timeline for 
independence and the creation of democratic institutions, made the UN an “accelerator of 
change.”297 This explains why Mason Sears, member of the 1954 Visiting Mission representing 
the United States, received such reprimand from his superiors and America from its peers for 
encouraging dialogue about a deadline for independence.  
While the UN provided the impetus for action, Belgium and their European ally, the 
White Fathers, were not themselves idle. They had supported the rise of Hutu engagement 
political and social dialogue through education and social networking, as well as the shift in the 
generational composition of the White Fathers that made them more sympathetic to the Hutu 
situation. The Hutu had the drive to gain independence and the Belgian-Catholic political 
alliance provided institutional support to see it to completion. It does not appear that the UN 
supported this move towards independence, despite the requirements of Article 76 of the Charter 
that required assistance in “[Ruanda-Urundi’s] progressive development towards self-
government or independence…”.298 Instead, the Visiting Mission as representative of the UN 
engaged in confusing directions, mocking dialogue, and blind ignorance of the power dynamics 
of situations.  While they praised Belgium for nearly abolishing whipping, they mentioned but 
did not interrogate Belgium’s replacement disciplinary practice of “restrictions on diet,” despite 
the recording in at least one petition that ‘restriction’ meant ‘completely prohibited.’299 Access to 
food was already understood to be a basic human right since the First World War. It was even 
something that the Belgians themselves had profoundly struggled with over the course of the 
                                                   
297 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 110. 
298 United Nations, “Charter of the UN.” 
299 United Nations Trusteeship Council, “Report on Ruanda-Urundi (T/1402),” para. 243. 
Rollinson 
 77 
World Wars, events that members of the Belgian colonial leadership likely lived through at least 
once.300 This makes it all the more appalling that colonial leaders manipulated this resource and 
that members of the Visiting Mission tolerated it. This insistence on power manipulation to 
maintain a position of dominance might explain why the revolutionary process became so 
violent.  As Frantz Fanon explained, “the very same [people] who had it constantly drummed 
into them that the only language they understood was that of force, now decided to express 
themselves with force.”301 
After all these considerations, did the Hutu or Tutsi political narratives succeed in 
influencing the Visiting Mission in 1957? At least in the short term, the answer is no, they did 
not. This analysis shows that, despite their acknowledgement and engagement with “Mise au 
Point” and “Hutu Manifesto,” the Mission had limited sympathy for peoples in Ruanda-Urundi. 
Over the subsequent years though, changes shifted the answer to the question to an affirmative 
influence. The power struggles and debates about social inequality and politics were grassroots 
movements in Ruanda. Yes, the Belgian and Catholic institutional systems were a vital support 
that enabled these nascent expressions to grow into movements and an eventual government. In 
that regard then, the combined powers outmaneuvered the United Nations. 
In conclusion, this suggests that the debate about Belgium versus the UN is a false 
binary. Belgium certainly was not enthusiastic about empowering Ruanda-Urundi to be an 
independent nation-state, much less recognizing it as the two separate entities that it historically 
was. They were far more focused on shaping Ruanda-Urundi into a territory that it could benefit 
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from economically. Likewise, the UN, guided significantly by the US, was more of a recorder 
than an influencer.  Thus, instead of treating actors in these events as a binary, scholarship 
should treat this period of Rwandan history like an optical prism treats light. Rather than framing 
this era as a race between only two diametrically opposed forces, studies of this narrative require 
a bright light to illuminate the events so that, like the prism, the elements of the event separate as 
unique parts that remain connected and eventually join at a confluence. Seeing this separation 
reveals the path to the final events while also avoiding oversimplification, deterministic, or 
anachronistic methods.  Rwanda was not merely the location of the events of this time. Instead, it 
was the inhabitance of peoples from scores of locations around the world and maintaining focus 
on this diversity and the works of peoples in Ruanda proves to be the keystone to this historical 






Dites-moi d'où il vient 
Enfin je saurai où je vais 
Maman dit que lorsqu'on cherche bien 
On finit toujours par trouver 
Elle dit qu'il n'est jamais très loin 
Qu'il part très souvent travailler 
Maman dit "travailler c'est bien" 
Bien mieux qu'être mal accompagné 
Pas vrai ? 
 
Où t'es, papaoutai? 
 
Tell me where he comes from 
At last I’ll know where to go 
Mom says that when you look hard 
You always find something 
She says he’s never very far away 
He leaves very often for work 
Mom says, “working is good” 
Better than being in bad company 
Isn’t that right? 
 
Where are you, Dad [where are you]?
 
“Papaoutai,” Racine Carrée, Stromae, 2013 
 
 
In 2017, Paul Van Haver, widely known by his stage name Stromae, canceled his tour 
scheduled to travel to Rwanda. Suffering hallucinations and other adverse side effects of anti-
malarial medications prescribed for his travel to Africa, Van Haver expressed sorrow for the last-
minute change.302 This was not just a public relation move to soothe disappointed fans but seems 
to have genuine feelings of morose behind the words. Van Haver was not just traveling for fans, 
but to visit his father’s homeland. His father, Pierre Rutare, was a Tutsi born in 1958 and was 
killed during the genocide in 1994.303 Thus, the lyrics from “Papaoutai” then take on more than 
just an artist’s imaginative but bitter words but convey the heartbroken views of a child who will 
never see his father again.  Born to a Belgian Flemish mother and Rwandan Tutsi father, he was 
raised and educated in Belgium. Heavily influenced by multiple cultural experiences and his 
musical education, “Papaoutai” reflects on his father’s death in the Rwandan genocide.304 This 
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deeper understanding of a simple pop song then becomes a way to understand the real 
consequences, if only for one child, of the outcome of the Rwandan pre-independence 
movement. 
Considering Van Haver’s family against the history detailed in this thesis provides an 
outline for Rutare’s departure from Rwanda. Given Van Haver’s birth in 1985, it is likely that his 
father fled Rwanda from one of the diasporas throughout the 1960s or 1970s. Since his father 
was an architect, he either acquired these skills in Rwanda or went to Belgium to do so. 
Traveling to Belgium for a refugee would have been simultaneously an odd and obvious choice. 
Fleeing to a French-speaking country suggests that Rutare spoke French. Identified by 
contemporary Rwandan sources as Tutsi, this strongly suggests that the colonial government 
taught him French in hope of perpetrating the colonial hierarchy rooted in the Hamitic 
Hypothesis.  Regardless of educational track, Belgian colonial propaganda, including education, 
highlighted the subordination of Africans to Belgians.305  However, education would have also 
supplied the cultural awareness to fit in more readily into Belgian society. This story, deduced 
from the diasporas and persecution against Tutsi and Tutsi sympathizers in the late twentieth 
century.  However, an interview in the Rwandan newspaper, The New Times, in 2015 with a 
relative of Stromae validates these details.306  
Van Haver’s father, Pierre Rutare, was a Tutsi born in 1958. When he was twenty years 
old, he “ingeniously managed to acquire a passport […] and later, a Belgian visa” to study 
architecture.307 He met Van Haver’s mother, Miranda Marie Van Haver, in Brussels while he 
was at university. The year after Van Haver’s birth, Rutare finished his degree and shortly after 
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returned to Rwanda to work with his father (Van Haver’s grandfather) as an architect.308 Less 
than a decade later, he died. Stromae’s music provides a compelling example of the way that 
families affected by the genocide process the trauma, thus connecting the past events to present 
cultural expressions. Likewise, the various news articles that collectively inform the Van 
Haver/Rutare family story show how different national and local communities from America, 
France, Belgium, and Rwanda acknowledge their role in the historical process and moment of 
the Rwandan genocide. 
This thesis has argued that it is necessary to understand the moments preceding Rwandan 
Independence as the beginning of the larger narrative of the Rwandan genocide. The late 1950s 
was a time of dynamic identity formation for the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, and within this 
decade 1957 was a watershed time. The events from that year included CSP’s “Mise au Point” 
and the évolués “Hutu Manifesto,” as well as the mwami’s Jubilee, and the United Nations 
Trusteeship Council’s triennial Visiting Mission. The subsequent events followed, including 
1958’s Hutu-Tutsi Commission, and reveal that events of 1957 solidified the vocabulary and 
social roles of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” and hence solidified the twisted, manipulated roles that 
Belgian colonial rule implanted upon their entrance as colonial ruler in the 1910s. This 
cementing of ethnic roles and social roles and restrictions within them meets the definition of at 
least the first stage of genocide – classification.309  While the vocabulary and social perceptions 
were not new to Rwandans, indeed they had used them for centuries, this was the point of 
acceptance, a renewed commitment to these terms. The second stage of genocide, symbolization, 
occurred with the use of the identification cards in the 1930s, providing the ability to isolate 
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groups from the population. Also at this time, the beginnings of the stages of discrimination and 
dehumanization also occurred and only accelerated moving into the 1960s and Rwandan 
independence.  
The introduction asserted that, to study the 1994 genocide, scholars must begin with the 
late 1950s. It is at this time, especially in 1957, when Rwandans chose to maintain the social 
segregation of the ethnic groups, Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa.310 This act demarcates the beginning of 
the process of genocide that concluded in July 1994.311 In other words, the late 1950s was a 
watershed moment. These years included various events that would drive forward the 
independence movement and drive a wedge between groups to emphasize their binary stances, 
summarized in the colloquialism ‘if you aren’t with us, then you’re against us.’ This turbulence 
established social and political elements that became fundamental to the feasibility of the 
genocide forty years later.  
To understand the crucial late 1950s means to understand the various actors interacting 
simultaneously. The main historical actors interacting are the Missionaries of Africa (White 
Fathers), the Tutsi ethnic group, the Hutu ethnic group, and international state-level actors (the 
United Nations, Belgium and the United States). Due to the complexity of these interactions, this 
thesis identified and analyzed the history and behavior of each group in turn. Isolating each 
group while also progressively layering and synthesizing preceding explanations allowed for 
appropriate analysis for each actor that with each additional actor complicated but informed the 
events of Rwanda’s pre-Independence history. Discussion of the 1950s also requires recognition 
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that Rwandan society did not begin with colonialization and acknowledgement that elements of 
Rwandan society that existed at the turn of the twentieth century became elements of colonial 
rule. Specifically, this the introduction explained the dynamic history of the terms “Hutu” and 
“Tutsi”. Recognizing the history of the terms Hutu and Tutsi displays that while these are 
dynamic terms, they decidedly exist in the Modern Era. This is the beginning of the rejection of 
the mistaken explanation of the Rwanda genocide as an “ancient tribal hatred.”312 
Chapter One identified and discussed the role of the White Fathers in Rwanda from 1900 
through the 1950s, including the use of education as a tool of empire. This discussion of the 
White Fathers was important because it explained the first colonialization that Rwandans 
experienced was religious and discussed how the White Fathers situated themselves as political 
actors within the colony. This discussion, thus, historicizes and contextualizes the role of 
religious leaders and locations during the 1994 genocide as sites of slaughter.313 This chapter 
explained the contentious relationship that the priests had with the Rwandan royalty and the 
power dynamics between the priests and Hutu.  From showing that the Hutu viewed the White 
Fathers as in possession of power to displaying the White Fathers implemented that power when 
the priests coordinated with the Belgians to usurp the mwami, these events prove that the priests 
were not solely in Rwanda to evangelize, but also to acquire power.  
Chapter Two identified and discussed the group of Tutsi elite who were members of the 
Conseil Supérieur du Pays, the mwami’s advisory council created by the Belgian colonial powers 
in 1954. It argues that their public political document “Mise au Point” aimed to manipulate the 
United Nations Trusteeship Council Visiting Mission prior to their triennial visit to the Belgian 
colony.  Given this aim and the writing being by the CSP, despite it being in French and not 
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Kinyarwandan, provides insights into their identity and thus a snapshot into Rwandan voices at a 
time when Western powers actively worked to silence those voices. Acknowledgement, 
discussion, and analysis of “Mise au Point” is important because it shows the initiation of the 
discussion about Rwandan ethnic groups that ignited over the following year. It also explains the 
impetus for “the Hutu Manifesto,” the subject of chapter three.  
Chapter Three operated in tandem to Chapter Two, discussing the elite members of Hutu 
society, those whom the Belgian colonial officials had deemed that they had ‘evolved,’ – the 
Hutu évolués. The integration of the évolués is important not only to converse with other existing 
scholarship regarding Belgian colonial rule in Ruanda-Urundi, but also because it shows that 
Rwandans were active participants in society and with international actors during colonialism. 
They not only exchanged information but had political conversations at and with the elite of 
society. The Hutu évolués used the master’s tools of education to dismantle the master’s house of 
colonial rule, but then they soon became the master themselves, subjugating Tutsi and their allies 
to the point of diaspora and eventually death.314 In short, this chapter shows the roots of the 
power inversion that occurred in 1959 when a Hutu political party seized political control and 
continued the push towards Independence. 
Chapter Four expanded upon after the preceding two chapter’s discussions on internal 
events and actors. This chapter argues that, to fully explain what was happening in the 1950s in 
central Rwanda, necessitates discussing not only who was living in Rwanda, but also who else 
stake claim or interest there. Mainly, these groups were the United Nations, Belgium, and the 
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United States. Discussion of these external actors is important because while it is vital to 
prioritize Rwandans in their own history, it is naïve to ignore the influence of powerful actors. 
Belgium was a powerful actor as the colonial government. The UN was a powerful actor as the 
catalyst for the global process of decolonization. The US was a Great Power following the 
outcome of the Second World War and held significant sway within the UN. This confluence of 
these actors, their intentions, and their concerns imprinted onto Rwanda and further inform and 
complicate the internal debates occurring there. This chapter also serves as a reminder that 
Africa exists not outside of global history, but as deeply intertwined as any other space or 
peoples.  
 The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was not a predetermined event, not even by the elite 
debates, human rights violations, political maneuvering, or physical violence of the 1950s. 
However, the longer these took place, the further events that occurred and actors made decisions 
that progressed Rwanda through the process of genocide until the event took place in April 1994. 
The start of this process began in 1957 with a political maneuver from one elite group, 
acknowledged and responded to by another group. Multiplied by international actors, 
opportunities to act appeared or disappeared according to one’s goals and resources. Discussion 
of the genocide and the slow historical progress towards it is not simple, but by challenging 
preconceived notions and giving agency to groups stereotypically deemed passive then it can 
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